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Since the fall of the communist bloc fifteen years ago, the practice of
democracy has spread infectiously from the old epicenters of Soviet power in Russia,
Central Asia and Eastern Europe through the distant African, Asian, and American
satellite states sponsored by the Cold War conflict. Some genuine democratic
transitions have taken place, while other shifts have been democratic more in form
than substance. But most of the countries of the world now at least go through the
motions of holding elections and making verbal obeisance to concomitant respect for
constitutional limits on government authority and incarnations of universal human
rights. Unless a nation has the economic, military, or political clout to shoulder its
way into the world community on its own, at least some show (although arguably, no
more than that) of respect for these values is perceived as necessary for successful
participation in vital international institutions and processes.
In the wake of these developments, there has been an explosion of “national
human rights institutions,” that is, independent government agencies whose purpose is
to promote enforcement of human rights. Whereas there were only a few national
human rights institutions before 1970, hundreds were established in the
democratization wave of the 1990s.1
Like holding elections, drafting constitutions with pristinely separated powers
and lengthy human rights guarantees, and ratifying international human rights
instruments, creating national human rights institutions has provided a way for new
democracies to signal a commitment to human rights and liberal values to the
1

See International Council on Human Rights Policy, Performance and Legitimacy: National Human
Rights Institutions 1 & 57-59 (March 2000), available at www.international-council.org (last visited
Mar. 7, 2005) (hereafter ICHRP report); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1993),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005) (hereafter
“UNHCR Fact Sheet”). The United States has not established national human rights institutions as
such on the federal level, preferring to channel such concerns exclusively through the courts apart from
a few specialized bodies like the EEOC. However, corollary institutions such as human rights
commissions and ombudspersons are more common in the United States on the state and municipal
level.
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international community.2 These institutions look much alike on paper, but their
actual effect has varied enormously from state to state. While some have languished
in limbo, awaiting legislative implementation or the appointment of key officials,
many are active, and some have become influential forces promoting human rights
within their states.3
Minority groups4 should be a primary constituency for institutions whose
mandate is to investigate claimed abuses and to protect vulnerable populations. Many
transitioning states are severely ethnically divided, with numerous minority groups,
languages and religions, and with entrenched divisions between the groups. These
divisions and the conflicts they produce represent a fundamental challenge for the
continuing existence of these states. In these conflicts, human rights and minority

2

Of course, this signaling purpose for acceding to international human rights standards is by no means
unique to new democracies. See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance,
97 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 879 (2003). But the development of new norms and institutions are
steps that are inherent to the process of creating a new government, and are therefore characteristic of,
although not exclusive to, new democracies’ efforts to signal compliance and thereby establish
international credibility.
3
See ICHRP report, supra note __, at111-17.
4

I am using the term “minority group” here and throughout the article to refer to a non-majority
community in a state made up of multiple communities, including ethnic, racial and religious groups.
This term, like the others used to describe groups in this article, is both highly contestable and
vigorously contested. Nonetheless, I have chosen to use it because the term is in wide use in spite of its
shortcomings and because much of what I will discuss in this article is a set of legal rights that are
commonly referred to as “minority rights,” and so it is helpful to use a corresponding term to describe
the groups to whom those rights might accrue. Those attempting to define the term “minority” have
managed to reach agree that a minority is a group of people within a state. The sticking points have
been (1) whether the test for minority status should be objective or subjective or both; (2) if objective,
(a) whether the relevant criterion for minority status should be relative numbers or power or both, and
(b) what other criteria are relevant for defining the scope of groups, e.g. ethnic, religious, or linguistic
differences; and (3) if subjective, whether the relevant viewpoint should be that of other communities,
that of the group in question, or both. See, e.g., Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities ¶ 568, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979). See also Explanatory Report,
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (entered into force 1998) (“It should
also be pointed out that the framework Convention contains no definition of the notion of ‘national
minority’…. based on the recognition that at this stage, it is impossible to arrive at a definition capable
of mustering general support of all Council of Europe member States.”)
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rights values are one set of battlefields, and claimed abuses are the weapons of choice
for allside s.5
Nonetheless, only a few of the newly established institutions in severely
divided states report developing programs to effectively reach minority populations,
and many shy away from involvement in their conflicts. Instead, the institutions that
report establishing programs or offices to address minority concerns tend to be in
better established democracies and less severely divided societies. The programs that
do exist in transitioning states tend to be limited, both in their aspirations and in their
implementation.6
To some extent, these lapses can be described in pragmatic terms, as failures
of resources, legal imagination, or political will. But on another level the question of
the relationship between minority groups and rights – individual liberal rights and
minority group rights – goes to the heart of a state’s vision of democracy. Should
these transitioning states constitute themselves as liberal democracies, minimizing
minority identities and emphasizing individual freedoms and a broader civic loyalty to
the state? Or would they do better to establishthemselves as communitarian
democracies, recognizing their multiple communities as the constituent elements of
the states? In these struggles to define the structure of political power, both minority
groups and the state put human rights values to use in service of their interests. 7

5

Northern Ireland presents a classic example of a severely divided state where human rights claims are
used by battling communities and the state. See Dominic Bryan, Parading Protestants and Consenting
Catholics in Northern Ireland, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 233 (2004).
6
As discussed below, many of the severely divided or transitioning states with minority-directed
programs are current or aspiring members of the European Union, spurred to action by EU mandates.
See discussion infra section C.2.
7
Of course, whatever its structure, a democracy need not be either liberal or communitarian in its
function. Instead, elections may serve as a guise for establishing authoritarian control, for instituting a
tyranny of the majority, or for minority rule through an effectively one-party system. However, few
governments will announce themselves as authoritarian. A final possibility, then, is an illiberal, noncommunitarian state that will nonetheless conceptualize and market its rule to the population and the
international community as the expression of either a confederation of multiple peoples, or of a single
national identity, whether civic or ethnic in nature. See generally FAREED ZAKARIA, ILLIBERAL
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National human rights institutions offer a useful vantage point for considering
these issues. While law professors and political scientists have the luxury of debating
the nature of rights over coffee at Starbucks, and while courtsrule on minority claims
that have been reformulated into the proper legal jargon, national human rights
institutions are the forum to which people come to demand their rights directly.
These institutions must make day to day decisions on how best to navigate the
conflicts and convergences of human rights and minority rights in the problems that
come before them. Their practical experiences and their own assessments of the
principles that ought to guide them provide a prism for viewing the contested ideals of
human and minority rights advocated by constitutional court doctrines and ivory
tower elites.
This article is based on three lines of research: a qualitative global study of
the work of national human rights institutions with minority groups; a review of case
studies of individual national human rights institutions and minority communities; and
interviews and participation in public discussion with individual ombudspersons and
commissioners. To my knowledge, the qualitative study I have conducted is the first
to look at the work of national human rights institutions with minority groups on a
global basis. My purpose in using this tripartite approach was, first, to offer new
empirical data about the work of national human rights institutions with minority
groups; and, second, to create synergies between the different types of information
produced by each line of research while balancing their inherent strengths and
weaknesses. The appendix at the end of this article describes my research
methodology, including the selection criteria and sources used for each of the three
lines of research.

DEMOCRACIES (2002).
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This article offers first, in part A, a discussion of the development of the
system of minority rights and the democracy theory concerning those rights that
provide the framework for the work of national human rights institutions on these
issues. In part B, I provide a brief introduction to national human rights institutions
and then discuss the results of my research concerning their work with minority
groups. I identify patterns and trends in the development of minority-directed
programs, and consider some of the crucial legal and political factors affecting such
programs.
In part C, I consider the implications of my findings for the essential concepts
of minority rights and democracy theory discussed in part A. The problem cases that
have always existed on the margins of democratic theory are far more central in
severely divided and transitioning states and seem to be increasing, both in number
and severity. This theory of minority rights, developed in well- established liberal
democratic states, ought not be exported directly to the context of new democracies.
Finally, in part D, I discuss what role national human rights institutions might
play in working with minority groups, focusing in particular on the complex concerns
that arise in states where indigenous groups govern themselves under their own legal
and political systems. While there are limits on the capacity of national human rights
institutions, they could play a greater role than they do byserving as a forum for
dialogue between minority groups and the state.
A.

Minority Rights in Democracies

1.

Group Conflict and International Rights

Most modern political states comprise multiple communities – ethnic,
religious, linguistic, and cultural – that have conflicting interests, rights, and political
preferences. Each state must determine how to accommodate these communities’
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divergent interests within its political and legal structure. While well-established
states struggle with these issues, particularly in the context of the rapid social
movements and changes produced by globalization, the problem is particularly acute
for transitioning states whose basic political structures are in flux. Because the makeup and interrelationships of communities are various and fluid, transitioning states
cannot expect to resolve this conundrum with a universal, readily transplantable
solution.
In this context, it must be noted that what Americans may consider obvious
and natural solutions to minority group tensions in fact represent American
exceptionalism based in the unrepresentative nature of American circumstances. The
United States’ indigenous communities8 represent a relatively small part of its
population and do not now pose a fundamental threat to its security or national
identity. Since its inception, the United States has been accustomed to sweeping
tides of immigration that have resulted in constantly shifting social group patterns,
and in accordant shifts in inter-group dynamics and allegiances. This is not to suggest
that there is not substantial, significant group conflict in American society: of course,
there is. But the scope and intensity of that conflict, as well as the risks that it poses,
are on a smaller scale than in other, severely divided states. The United States has
also developed a tradition of democratic process and judicial review that offers nonviolent mechanisms for producing social change, such as lobbying and lawsuits, that
8

As with the term “minority group,” see discussion supra note __, there is no single authoritative
definition for the term “indigenous.” The term originated as a self-designation to facilitate political
activism in the United Nations and other international contexts. See JOHN H. BODLEY, CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY: TRIBES, STATES, AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 361 (1994). The International Labor
Organization defines indigenous peoples as: “peoples in independent countries who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the
establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.” Convention (No. 169) Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991), art. 1
(hereafter “ILO Convention No. 169”). The convention also endorses self-identification as “a
fundamental criterion” for indigenous or tribal status. Id., art. 2.
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have been at least relatively open to minority groups. Accordingly, the American
approach has been to guarantee a unique status for indigenous peoples and individual
rights for other minority group members, while relying on representation through
political parties and political process rather than group accommodations, rights or
power-sharing to assure inter-group stability. Whatever the pros and cons of these
mechanisms in the American context, they are grounded in and shaped by that
context.
In other states with different socio-political settings, the dynamics, the stakes,
and the solutions are different. Ethnic and religious conflict is a frequent catalyst of
unrest, war, and state failure. Separatist claims by communities that feel alienated
from the state threaten the identity and territorial integrity of states from the Russian
Federation to Indonesia to Iraq. Some states arecomprised almost entirely of
indigenous groups with claims that predate the state, and there may be hundreds of
such groups, each with their own interests, cultures, and languages, as in Nigeria and
Nepal. Inter-group rivalries and allegiances may likewise extend back for generations
before the establishment of the state.9
Minority groups may have little or no opportunity to use lawsuits enforcing
individual rights to raise their concerns, either because individual rights are not
directly enforceable in court (as they are not in many states), or because the concerns
of minority groups are not encompassed by purely individual rights, as when they
concern questions of autonomy or land. By its nature, of course, the democratic
process limits minority influence in policy-making by centering political power in
majoritarian institutions. This problem can be exacerbated in transitioning states that
have mastered the form of democracy in the shape of elections, but have not yet
9

See e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985); Rotimi N. Suberu, Federalism and
Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (2001).
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developed the underpinnings of strong political parties or institutions of civil society
that might integrate minority constituent interests into political platforms. In these
contexts, states have adopted a range of political solutions, from explicit political
power-sharing arrangements on the national level, to local guarantees of selfgovernment, to, on the other hand, deliberate repression of non-dominant minority
groups and identities.10
At this point, it is worth pausing to consider: Why is this issue important to the
state? Why don’t states simply ignore the claims of non-dominant communities who
do not succeed in asserting those claims through the existing political and legal
structure? Often, of course, states do ignore minority claims. But, as often, they
cannot. If the state lacks the means to suppress, or at least to contain, separatist
movements and minority calls for recognition and autonomy, it must somehow
accommodate them, or risk destabilization.11 Often, it is the reality of violent conflict
that moves a state to take account of minority concerns.12 And where such internal
pressure does not exist, international pressure often plays a role.13 Finally, states with
a true commitment to liberal democratic values will find themselves hard-pressed to
deny entirely minority communities’ claims without abandoning fundamental precepts
of justice and equality.14
Under these influences and imperatives, many states have pursued strategies
of limited accommodation. One such strategy has been the recognition of extensive
10

See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development and Human Rights 129-41
(1990).
11
See e.g., Shaista Shameem, New Impulses in the Interaction of Law and Religion: The Fiji Human
Rights Commission in Context, 2003 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 661, 662 (2003).
12
See Kieren McEvoy & John Morison, Beyond the Constitutional “Moment”: Law, Transition and
Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 26 Fordham Int’l L. J. 961, 993 n. 101 (2003); Honourable Hari N.
Ramkarran, Seeking a Democratic Path: Constitutional Reform in Guyana, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L.
585, 597-98 (2003).
13
See Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final
Status, 31 Denv. J. Int’l. L. & Policy 387 (2003).
14
See Mark D. Rosen, Liberalism and Illiberalism, 12 J. Contemporary Legal Issues 803, 830-31
(2002).
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minority rights, both on an individual and group basis.15 To this end, a body of
international and regional treaties has developed guaranteeing some rights to minority
and indigenous groups, ranging from rights of self-determination, to rights to promote
their own culture, religion, and language, to rights of equality and non-discrimination
under the law.16 Especially in the last fifteen years, constitutions and national
legislation have also implemented at least some minority and indigenous rights
protections.17 However, many of the most robust and well elaborated statements of
minority rights come in the form of unenforceable declarations and many are subject
to numerous caveats acknowledging the ultimate sovereignty of the state.18
Furthermore, the legitimacy of minority rights as such is highly contested, and
the nature of those rights (if their legitimacy is accepted in principle), hardly less so.
There are three problematic aspects to defining minority rights: determining the
content of those rights; determining to which groups those rights will accrue; and
determining whether the rights are collective or individual in nature.19
The best-established minority rights are those that are an integral part of the
human rights canon. The prohibitions on genocide and discrimination, and the rights
to practice one’s religion, use one’s language, and enjoy one’s culture without
15

Protecting minority rights rather than universal rights is not a new phenomenon, but rather,
represents a resurgence of an earlier practice. As concern over minority groups’ vulnerability rose in
Europe in the early part of the twentieth century, states agreed to bilateral and then multilateral treaties
protecting particular minority groups. These earlier treaties were then superceded by the individual
human rights approach after World War II. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 2 (1985)
(hereafter “Multicultural Citizenship”).
16
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 26 & 27 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) (hereafter “ICCPR”); Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
(entered into force 1 February 1998) (hereafter “National Minorities Framework Convention”);
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 3, (entered into
force Sept. 5, 1991) (hereafter “ILO Convention No. 169”).
17
See, e.g., ETH. CONST., art. 39.
18
See, e.g., Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Adopted by the
U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution
1994/45, August 26, 1994. U.N. Dec./CN.4/1995/2, E/CN./Sub.2/1994/56, at 105 (1994); Proposed
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Approved by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th regular session.
19
See Miriam J. Aukerman, Definitions and Justifications: Indigenous and Minority Group Protections
in a Central/East European Context, 22.4 HUMAN RTS. Q. 1011, 1030-32 (2000).
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interference from the state are well established in positive law and are accepted by
most states, at least in principle.20 While they tend to operate for the benefit of
minority groups, only the cultural rights are defined by reference to minority status.
Although these rights, particularly the cultural rights, are generally exercised in a
group, they are understood to be enforceable in court by individuals rather than by the
group as a whole.21
In contrast, while the right to self-determination has been asserted repeatedly
in international instruments such as the UN charter, there is not consensus on the
scope of this right nor on which groups are entitled to exercise it. Because it is a right
that is understood to be collective rather than individual, it is often treated as nonjusticiable.22 And although a set of other, commonly asserted minority rights has
emerged – rights of participation as well as autonomy, rights to measures designed to
achieve substantive as well as procedural equality, rights to self-definition as well as
self-determination – there is not broad international consensus on these additional
rights either.
Some of the most difficult minority-related issues for national human rights
institutions lurk here, at the cusp of newly developing minority rights. The most
notable recent developments in recent minority rights standards have been
implemented through new, regionally accepted treaties focused specifically on
minority rights, such as the International Labor Organization’s Convention No. 169
on indigenous peoples (ratified primarily by American states) and the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ratified solely by European
20

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951) (hereafter “Genocide Convention”); ICCPR, supra note __, art. 1, 26, & 27.
21
Protection against discrimination extends to all individuals, while protection against genocide is held
by all members of national, ethnic, religious, or racial groups, regardless of minority status. See
ICCPR, supra note __, art. 26-27; Genocide Convention, supra note __, art. 2.
22
See, e.g., R.L. v. Canada, Communication No. 358/1989: Canada 28/11/90. CCPR/C/43/D/358/1989
(UN Human Rights Committee decision).
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states).23 These treaties list extensive and detailed rights accruing to the protected
groups, far beyond the general principles of prior human rights treaties. For example,
ILO Convention No. 169 not only protects indigenous groups’ rights to use their
traditional lands, but also requires states to take account of their spiritual connection
to the land, traditional ownership and methods of transmitting land, and their
traditional use and natural resources. Not only must states permit indigenous
communities to maintain their own internal legal systems, they must also respect their
methods of punishment and take account of their culture when punishing them in state
courts.24 Likewise, the Framework Convention not only guarantees national
minorities’ use of their own language privately, but also on public signs, with the
authorities in minority areas, and upon arrest.25
But it is not merely in their specificity and extent that these claimed but
contested minority rights differ from older, better accepted ones. While minority
community members’ rights to non-discrimination and equality under the law are
readily exercised and enforced as individual rights, some of the interests promoted by
these new treaties are by their nature exercised either by the community as a whole, or
at least by community members in concert with one another. In particular, the specific
rights to use of land and to legal systems protected by the ILO convention are less
consonant with political and civil liberties, which are held and enforced individually,
23

ILO Convention No. 169 requires states to implement “special measures” to protect indigenous
peoples and their cultures in areas as law, development, land use, and education, but it has been ratified
by a limited number of countries, most heavily in Central and South America. These rights apply only
to indigenous peoples as defined by the treaty. See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note __, art. 1 & 5;
International Labor Organization website, ratifications, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last viewed Feb. 25, 2005).. See also Framework Convention, supra note __;
Explanatory Report, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, par. 13;
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe) (entered into force Mar. 1,
1998). The Framework Convention has been ratified by virtually all European states, but it has no
equivalent outside of Europe and has not been ratified by any non-European states. See Council of
Europe website, Treaty office, Framework convention ratification page, http://conventions.coe.int (last
visited February 27, 2004)
24
See ILO No. 169, supra note __.
25
See Framework Convention, supra note __.
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and more consonant with economic and social rights, which are held collectively and
therefore often regarded as non-justiciable. It is notable, therefore, that even as it
ensures rights such as language that could be characterized as group or collective
rights, the Framework Convention on National Minorities carefully couches these
rights as accruing to individual community members, rather than to the communities
themselves.26 In so doing, it makes its mandates more amenable to enforcement in
courts; however, it simultaneously limits the scope and character of the rights that can
be claimed. Some minority groups have complained that their interests are
fundamentally diminished for being reduced from collective claims to individual
ones, and from claims for community governance to claims for particularized
protections for narrow interests.27 Minority claims that are either collective or socioeconomic in nature, or both, have presented challenges for national human rights
institutions.
The other sense in which these new rights are defined differently than the old
is in the relationship that these treaties anticipate the state will develop with its
minority groups. Ordinarily, states are expected to respect minority groups by not
interfering with them (e.g., by granting autonomy, ignoring private cultural practices,
and so on) or by actively protecting them from outside threats.28 These new treaties
require the state also to consult with indigenous and national minority groups, to
interact with them, and to grant them the right to participate authoritatively in the
state, rather than solely giving them a defined sphere of autonomy. Thus, ILO
Convention No. 169 does not merely require the state not to interfere with indigenous
groups’ traditional land through development, nor merely to protect indigenous

26

See id.
See C.C. Tenant and M.E. Turpel, A Case Study of Indigenous Peoples: Genocide, Ethnocide and
Self-Determination, 59 Nordic J. Int’l L 287, 291 (1990).
28
See, e.g. ICCPR, supra note __, art. 27.
27

Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs –Page 12

groups from unwanted development by private parties, but also to consult with
indigenous groups about the state’s development plans that would affect them and
about the groups’ own independently determined development goals, and to ensure
that they are able to participate in decision-making. 29 Similarly, although less
extensively, the Framework Convention requires states to “create the conditions
necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in
social, economic and cultural life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting
them.”30
This is a far more sophisticated vision of the relationship between indigenous
groups and the state, and one that is in some ways far more demanding than a mere
cession of limited autonomy. In particular, and as will be discussed at length later,
these complex demands are also reflected in the claims received by national human
rights institutions, and theyrequire the state to develop fora for effective dialogue
between the minority group and the state.
Finally, where a framework of minority rights has succeeded in taking root,
the recharacterization of minority interests as legal rights has proven a powerful
rhetorical and legal tool for minority groups. The resurgence of minority rights
principles in recent years has permitted groups to move certain battles from the
political arena (where they frequently lost) to the legal arena (where their record may
improve), and to use this threatened change of venue as an additional bargaining chip
in the political realm as well. It has also provided minority groups with a legally
cognizable shield against human rights based attacks by the state. Instead of claiming
their internal practices represent an extra-legal, cultural exception to legal human
rights standards, they can now reify their cultural claim as a legal one, the human
29
30

See ILO Treaty No. 169, supra note __, art. 6-7.
See Framework Convention, supra note __, art. 15.
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right to practice and preserve their culture.31 The trade-off is, as discussed above, that
to make these claims legally cognizable in the current legal structures, they must be
limited and narrowed. But in at least some cases, this trade-off may be worthwhile.
For human rights claims cut both ways: while I have thus far discussed only
the ways in which minority groups use rights to pursue their agendas with the state,
states also use human rights claims to contain and control minority groups.
Communities may be perceived as challenging the liberal values promoted by human
rights law, and state recognition of “cultural exceptions” to human rights guarantees
or of some level of autonomy or self-government outside the scope of human rights
guarantees may be regarded as “shield[ing] illiberal and undemocratic enclaves.”32 A
minority community’s failure to adhere to human rights principles may serve as a
point of criticism by the state, justifying interference with community norms or
institutions.33 Alternatively, community members may themselves turn to the state to
enforce their rights.
Human rights guarantees thus present an acute catalyst of conflict between
minority communities and the state, as well as a mechanism for channeling conflicts
between minority groups and the state. Accordingly, the patterns of those conflicts in
new democracies depends to some extent on the system of minority group protections
the transitioning state adopts.
2.

Democracy Theory

31

Concerning conflicts between human rights claims and culture, see Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims
and Saviors: The Metaphors of Human Rights, 42 Harv. Int’l L. J. 201 (2001); Leti Volpp, Feminism
versus Multiculturalism, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1181, 1187 (2001); L. Amede Obiora, “Supri, supri,
supri, Oyibo?” An Interrogation of Gender Mainstreaming Deficits, 29:2 Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society 649, 654 (2003).
32
James Tully, Strange Multiplicity 191 (1995) (criticizing this perception).
33
See, e.g., Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Female Genital Cutting (2002).
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Democracy theorists who focus on questions of minority rights offer a range
of views about the proper place and scope of those rights.34 For purposes of this
discussion, there are three focal points on this spectrum that represent important
touchstones for newly emerging democracies: traditional liberalism, liberal pluralism,
and communitarianism.35
On the one hand, liberal thinkers such as Chandran Kukathas and Jürgen
Habermas argue that the core of legitimate democracy is individual, liberal rights.
Traditional liberals contend that these rights adequately protect minority cultures, and
that minority group claims that cannot be characterized as classic liberal, individual
rights inevitably conflict with and diminish those individual rights in practice.36 The
United States has by and large adopted this approach, providing minorities with the
full gamut of individual political and civil liberties including the right to be free from
discrimination, and providing particular minority protections only through narrowly

34

The writing on the place of minority group rights in the democratic state is only one branch, albeit a
fairly discrete one, of the vast literature on minority and majority groups in the modern state. See, e.g.,
Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977); Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983);
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1991); Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Law and
National Pluralism (2004).
35
Surrounding these three focal points are numerous subtle distinctions and debates that I cannot
explore here, in the interest of focusing on those aspects that are most crucial to my study. Several
concerns that I do not discuss are the relative “thickness” or “thinness” of national and minority
identities, the significance of other political values to this debate, and the contested definitions of
virtually every crucial term. See, e.g., Multiculturalism (ed. Amy Guttman 1994) (essays including
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the
Democratic Constitutional State, and K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival:
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction).
36
See Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in
MULTICULTURALISM, supra note __, at 113 (“A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics
of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity
is formed. This does not require an alternative model that would correct the individualistic design of
the system of rights through other normative perspectives. All that is required is the consistent
actualization of the system of rights.”). Chandran Kukathas makes the more modest claim that while
liberalism may not optimally protect minority interests, it nonetheless provides the best possibility for
conflicting groups and individuals to co-exist by not promoting any individual or group notion of the
good but merely “upholding the framework of law within which individuals and groups can function
peacefully.” See Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago 249 (2003) (hereafter “Liberal
Archipelago”).
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crafted exceptions granting autonomy for Native Americans and permitting racial
distinctions to facilitate certain affirmative action programs.
In contrast, “liberal pluralists” such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor
argue that traditional theorists err by conceiving of the liberal state as culturally
neutral, when it in fact possesses and enforces certain culturally specific
characteristics (such as its choice of official language) on a multicultural polity. 37
Because individuals value their cultures and can exercise freedom of choice
meaningfully only in the context of those cultures, individual autonomy requires that
minority cultures be preserved Accordingly, providing some additional, systematic
protections for minority groups with other cultural characteristics will not necessarily
conflict with, and will in fact often promote, core liberal values of justice and
individual autonomy.38
The difficult questions for liberal pluralists are identifying which groups
should be entitled to protections, what sorts of claims should be recognized, and what
sort of protections are appropriate. Liberal pluralists such as Kymlicka have
developed a typology of groups (e.g., immigrants, national minorities, and indigenous
groups) and of the corresponding claims they might make (non-discrimination,
respect for language, territorial autonomy) and the justifications for those claims
(distinctiveness, consent, authenticity, and so on). On the margins, of course, these
are line-drawing questions, but liberal pluralists approach these questions in the first
instance by weighing the justifications in liberal philosophy for each group’s core
37

The terms to be used in describing the plural communities within a state are many and contested. I
am using the term “multicultural” here as the broadest of those terms, to encompass, many kinds of
difference within a state. However, liberal writers more frequently deploy narrower terms such as
“multinational,” “polynational,” “polyethnic,” and so on, to distinguish amongst communities as to the
basis and legitimacy of their claims for protection, and to describe the subset of groups for which they
would endorse such protections. “Multiculturalism,” therefore, describes the total set of communities
within the state, and not the subset(s) of groups for which one or another liberal thinker would endorse
protections. See Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __, at 10.
38
See id. at 75-84; Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism, supra note __.
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claims. The hard cases are those groups, claims, or protections that threaten to
impinge on liberal values or that place liberal values in conflict with each other.39
From either the traditional or the new perspective, however, liberals agree that
a fundamental risk in recognizing minority group claims for cultural protections or
self-government is that these communities will form illiberal enclaves that will
threaten the state’s essential character as a liberal democracy.40 For liberals, then, the
limits of the state’s toleration of a minority community’s peculiar qualities and
practices is set by the group’s illiberal tendencies.41 South Africa has adopted a
version of the liberal pluralist approach. Its constitution protects minority languages,
cultures and religions and recognizes the authority of tribal governments, but its
constitutional court has consistently held that the constitution’s individual liberties
trump these minority group protections, so that for example traditional inheritance
rules cannot be applied to disfavor women.42
Communitarians such as James Tully argue that liberal values should be only
one of many sets of values in a robust constitutional democracy.43
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Beginning with

See Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __, at 75-84.
See Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __, at 75. A second, inter-related risk is to the unity of the
state. If the liberal democratic state is held together by a common faith in liberal democratic values,
then the illiberal values of some communities undermines state unity. See Liberal Archipelago, supra
note __, at 98.
41
This is, of course, not the end of the argument. For a discussion of the details of this ongoing debate
between traditional liberals (Liberalism I) and new liberals (Liberalism II), see Tierney, supra note __,
at 51-68. Kymlicka, Taylor and the rest disagree sharply not only on line-drawing, but also on vital
questions of the basis for discerning the character of particular claims, whether some group and claims
can call upon foundational principles of the liberal state to reconcile their claims with liberal ideals and
compel their recognition, and whether it might in some instances be appropriate for liberal democratic
states to recognize certain minority group claims in spite of the concomitant risk or reality of
illiberality, but without reaching consensus on these issues. See Multicultural Citizenship 94-101;
Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in Ethnicity and Group Rights 72-78 (comparing but not
endorsing the views of John Rawls, Will Kymlicka and Deborah Fitzmaurice).
42
See S. AF. CONST.; Shibi case, 2004 CCT 49/03, (S. Af. Const. Ct. 2004).
43
While Kymlicka and Taylor are at times identified as communitarians by traditional liberals, they
straddle the gap between the traditional liberal and communitarian positions. The line I draw between
liberal pluralists and communitarians is whether the theorist uses core liberal values as the ultimate test:
liberal pluralists insist that minority communities must cede at least to certain core liberal values;
communitarians do not. See Taylor, supra note __, at 60 (“Even pluralist models of liberalism “do call
for the invariant defense of certain rights, of course. There would be no question of cultural
differences determining the application of habeas corpus, for example.” (emphasis in original)).
40
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the two premises endorsed by liberal pluralists (that liberal constitutional states
endorse a particular set of cultural values and that individuals perceive the value of
their choices and exercise their autonomy within the cultural values established by
their communities), Tully and other communitarians argue that constitutional
democracy should not center on individual rights or on participation in a
constitutional order that is preconceived as privileging a certain set of liberal rights.
Rather, for a constitutional order to be legitimate, all the communities44 within the
state must be true constituents of the state, in the sense that their preferences as to
how the state should be constituted and organized must be incorporated into the state
order.45 Inevitably, this will produce a non-uniform order, as communities will have
different preferences.46 Sanctifying liberal rights over other rights and interests
preferred by minority communities thus undermines the legitimacy of the democracy
for those communities.47 For Tully and other communitarians, therefore, not liberal
values but authenticity is the touchstone, and not tolerance, but incorporation (at least,
to the extent desired by the community) is the goal.
However, since most individuals are members of multiple communities, and
since each of those communities is likely to have at least slightly different
preferences,48 the difficulty for communitarians, as for liberals, is determining which
communities to privilege. Because community values will inevitably and frequently
come into conflict, particularly when extruded from the community and incorporated
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For a discussion of the competing definitions of community for purposes of communitarian theory,
including geographical and kin communities, perceptions of the common good, and shared interests,
see Liberal Archipelago, supra note __, at 168-78.
45
“[C]ulture is an irreducible and constitutive aspect of politics. … if the cultural ways of the citizens
were recognized and taken into account in reaching an agreement on a form of constitutional
association, the constitutional order, and the world of everyday politics it constitutes, would be just
with respect to this dimension of politics. Since the diverse cultural ways of the citizens are excluded
or assimilated, it is, to that extent, unjust.” TULLY, supra note __, at 5-6.
46
See id. at 55-56.
47
See id. at 86-89.
48
See Liberal Archipelago, supra note __, at 177.
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into the state as a whole, the hard cases, for communitarians, are those that require
either/or, irreconcilable choices between community preferences that “conflict
violently in practice.”49 In so doing, communitarians use criteria such as authenticity
and continuity of community traditions, criteria that overlap with liberal pluralist
concerns, especially in so far as they tend to favor the groups also favored by the
liberal pluralist typology, namely indigenous groups followed by other national
minorities.50 Ethiopia has adopted a version of the communitarian approach:
recognized ethnic groups have the constitutional right to cultural protections, selfgovernment and even secession, and the question of whether liberal rights also
protected by the constitution must be enforced within self-governing communities has
not yet been decided.51
As these theories are exported to transitioning states in the form of
international pressure to ratify human rights and minority rights treaties and to include
protections in their constitutions, most new democracies have adopted one or another
of these basic approaches, at least formally. Both the state and its minority groups
have begun exploring the opportunities these legal structures present for framing and
pursuing their interests. In this conflicted context, national human rights institutions
are positioned, if they wish, to play an active role.
B.

National Human Rights Institutions and Minority Groups

1.

What Are National Human Rights Institutions?

National human rights institutions are the latest tool to be touted by
international bodies and funded by international donors for effective enforcement of
human rights on the national level. As such, they represent another aspect of the
ongoing effort to export human rights norms to transitioning states. At least on the
49

TULLY, supra note _, at 6.
See id. at 138.
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See ETH. CONST., art. 39.
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formal level, this effort has been successful: more states have established national
human rights institutions in the last twenty years than in all the time before. Virtually
every national human rights institution in Africa and Latin America has been
established since 1985.52
In essence, national human rights institutions are independent government
agencies directed at human rights concerns. They are intended to complement the
work of other government institutions such as courts, and of private institutions such
as non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), in investigating and redressing human
rights abuses. They are designed to be highly accessible to the public by maintaining
an open door policy for accepting complaints. They are also meant to be influential
with the government, but not according to the benchmark that human rights advocates
typically call upon, enforcement. Rather than enforcing human rights by ordering
reforms as a court would do, national human rights institutions promote change by
means of persuasion, and have no direct coercive powers.53
Most national human rights institutions are organized as one of two major
types, human rights commissions or ombudspersons. There are also numerous
hybrids and variations on these central types, of which perhaps the most widespread is
the office of the defensores del pueblo, a Central and South American variation on the
ombudsperson.54 The functions of national human rights institutions, however named
and organized, typically include investigating possible human rights abuses either sua
52

See Lorena González Volio, The Ombudsman Institution: The Latin American Experience 5 (noting
that the only ombudsman established in Latin America before 1990 was Guatemala’s in 1985, and that
“the process of creating and incorporating the institution of the Ombudsman… arises in the nineties,
when the so called ‘transition to democracy’ period began”); Mary Ellen Tsekos, Human Rights
Institutions in Africa, 9 Hum. Rts. Br. 21, 21 (2002).
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See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 19, National
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1993), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) ( hereafter “UNHCR Fact
Sheet”).
54
See ICHRP report, supra note__, at 4; Building Democratic Institutions, supra note __.
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sponte or in response to complaints; issuing non-binding recommendations;
organizing education, training and publicity programs; and reporting to national
legislatures and international bodies.55
The United Nations, the international community at large, and the academic
literature on the subject of national human rights institutions have all tended to focus
on national human rights commissions and to brush aside ombudspersons as
subsidiary bodies that serve many of the same functions.56 This has had two
unfortunate results: first, a failure to notice the work being done by ombudspersons,
especially on minority rights, that has important ramifications for the field (discussed
in the next part); and also, a tendency to conflate the two bodies that overlooks
substantial differences between them despite their overlapping roles. For although
they share a common purpose and certain general attributes such as flexible, informal
procedures, ombudspersons and human rights commissions have different histories
and core functions. In particular, while human rights commissions often work on
individual cases, they also investigate and make recommendations concerning
systemic human rights violations on an institutional or national level.57 In contrast,
the ombudsperson’s core function is not to analyze and comment on broad issues in
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See Building Democratic Institutions, supra note __.
See Marnie Lloydd & Alexander H.E. Morawa, Ombudspersons and Minority Rights, at 2-3,
available at European Centre or Minority Issues website, www.ecmi.de (last viewed Jan. 25, 2005).
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Human rights commissions usually have jurisdiction over both government and private conduct.
Linda Reif notes that human rights commissions may be better suited to address human rights
complaints in states that have both institutions, because they can handle complaints “which arise in
both the private and public spheres, typically enjoy a stronger arsenal of powers, are often directed to
provide educational and promotional activities and employ human rights norms as an imperative aspect
of their mandate.” Linda C. Reif, The Promotion of International Human Rights Law by the Office of
the Ombudsman, in The International Ombudsman Anthology, 272 (ed. Linda C. Reif 1999) (hereafter
“Promotion”). They are also more likely than ombudspersons to be empowered to advise the
legislature on pending legislation or on ratification of or compliance with international human rights
treaties. See Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to the Protection of
Human Rights, The Harry Street Lecture, University of Manchester (21 November 2002). Some states
have established an individual commissioner who operates more like an ombudsperson than like a
human rights commission, in spite of the title. See Mjemmas G.J. Kimweri, The Effectiveness of an
Executive Ombudsman, in The International Ombudsman Anthology, supra, at 382-85 (Tanzanian
Permanent Commission of Enquiry).
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the abstract, but to resolve individual complaints. However, an ombudsperson may
recognize systemic problems and recommend solutions that range from personal
responses to individual petitioners to structural changes across government
institutions. Its influence, like that of the human rights commission, therefore extends
beyond the limits of the immediate case to the government and nation as a whole.58
In spite of the shared name, these human rights commissions are different
from the “truth commissions” and “human rights commissions” that transitioning
governments sometimes establish to address the transitional justice problem of abuses
by past regimes, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.
Transitional justice-oriented truth and human rights commissions are temporary and
typically have jurisdiction only over the prior government, not the present one. In
contrast, national human rights institutions are permanent and have jurisdiction over
the present government. As such, they serve different purposes: transitional justice
commissions aim to account for the atrocities of the past and promote reconciliation
in the present, while national human rights institutions are meant to call the current
government to account in the present and promote better policies for the future.59
The authority of national human rights institutions to remedy human rights
violations usually extends only to investigation and recommendation and not to
binding judgment or to direct enforcement of their recommendations. The primary
58

The office of the ombudsman originated under the Swedish monarchy in the eighteenth century to
investigate government maladministration and was gradually adopted by other states for this purpose.
Accordingly, ombudspersons usually have jurisdiction only over government, not private, actions. As
concern with human rights has grown, some ombudsperson’s offices have taken on investigation of
government human rights violations under the umbrella of their general authority to investigate
government misconduct. Recently, states have begun to establish ombudspersons with the specific
mandate of human rights enforcement. See Lloyd & Morawa, supra note __; Promotion, supra note
__, at 273-74 & 288-91.
59
National human rights commissions are also different from the similarly named United Nations
Human Rights Commission, which is an international body addressing human rights concerns
worldwide, and from both international and national non-governmental organizations that may also
have similar names. Because so many different kinds of institutions are referred to as “human rights
commissions,” one can determine whether an organization is a national human rights institution only
by looking at its mandate and organization, and not merely at its name.
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tools used by these institutions to promote change are therefore direct mediation
between the parties to resolve individual complaints, and publicity, reporting, and
public shaming to promote changes in public policy. Some institutions do, however,
have standing to bring disciplinary actions, lawsuits, or other proceedings against
government officials and entities to remedy violations of the law, as does the
Namibian Ombudsman.60
On first consideration, these limits on judgment and enforcement seem to
represent a disturbing trade-off between institutional effectiveness and states’
willingness to establish human rights institutions in the first place.61 However, the
trade-off is not so stark as it may seem. National human rights institutions operate in
the context of other institutions that do have enforcement powers, such as the courts,
and they are intended to supplement, not to replace, those institutions.62
Such critiques also fail to recognize the inherent limits on the effectiveness of
enforceable legal mechanisms: they are expensive, inaccessible and slow, and
therefore often go unused. For everyday claims, the national human rights institution
offers a swift means for an individual to get behind the walls of bureaucracy and have
his complaint considered by the otherwise inaccessible officials who have the
authority to remedy his concern. Similarly, in controversial, high profile cases,
60

See Udo Kempf and Marco Mille, The Role and Function of the Ombudsman: Personalised
Parliamentary Control in Forty-Eight Different States, in THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN
ANTHOLOGY, supra note __, at 195, 217 (Appendix 3). This is particularly important in countries that
limit standing to raise constitutional challenges to certain government officials. As Lloyd and Morawa
note, this role is particularly vital in “countries in transition,” where many old laws and institutional
practices may conflict with the new constitution and where there may be a lack of institutional
traditions and practices to rectify the matter. See Lloyd & Morawa, supra note __ at 10.
61
This bears on the question often raised in human rights circles concerning the enforceability of
human rights norms: whether unenforceable or unenforced norms are valuable even in the breach, or
whether they are at times implemented even if unenforceable, and if so, why and how. See, e.g., Oona
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Work?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002). My argument is one
commonly although not universally endorsed by ombudspersons: that the lack of enforcement
mechanisms makes these institutions complementary to and at times even more effective than courts
and other binding means of enforcing human rights.
62
Also, obstruction of the ombudsperson or failure to follow her formal recommendation is a
punishable offense in some states, even if the ombudsperson lacks enforcement power of her own See
Lorena González Volio, The Ombudsman Institution: The Latin American Experience 24.
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national human rights institutions have been at times arguably more effective
precisely because their investigations do not present as direct and immediate a threat
to governments as they would if their conclusions were enforceable.63 National human
rights institutions have in fact investigated controversial, high profile allegations of
severe government abuse, and their conclusions and recommendations have revealed
and challenged otherwise untouched and seemingly untouchable government policies
and practices. It is then up to other forces in society to pick up the gauntlet thrown
down by the national human rights institution, and to provide the pressure necessary
to back the institution’s call for change.64 Thus, the appropriate comparison in many
ordinary cases is not between the enforcement mechanisms available through a court
and the lack of mechanisms available to the human rights institution, but between
having human rights claims evaluated through some process, even if only advisory, or
not having them addressed at all.
2.

Minority-Directed Programs

Although national human rights institutions are well situated to play a
complementary role to other state and non-governmental agencies byreach ing out to
vulnerable and underrepresented minority communities and by intervening in human
rights based conflicts between minority groups and the state, they tend to be used in
much more conservative and limited ways. I will begin by giving an overview of the
minority-directed programs that do exist, and then turn to thelegal and political
reasons that national human rights institutions’ involvement in minority issues tends
to be limited. After considering and accounting for these limits, the experiences of
institutions that have struggled with minority concerns expose issues that go to the
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But see Vijayashri Sripati, India’s National Human Rights Commission: A Shackled Commission?,
18 BOSTON UNIV. INT’L L.J. 1, 30-31 (2000).
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See ICHRP Report, supra note __, at 26 & 63 (Malaysia & Togo).
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heart of the relationship between minority groups, human rights claims, and
democracy. I will turn to those in part C.
In spite of the socio-political context of acute minority relations issues in
transitioning states and a developing framework of minority rights as a legal context
for human rights work, most national human rights institutions do not work on
minority group issues as such. Indeed, my survey of the public reports, websites, and
promotional materials of hundreds of institutions around the world found that only a
few describe working on minority issues or with minority groups as being a priority in
their work.65 Corroborating the results of this general survey were my discussions
with individual ombudspersons at a conference of the International Ombudsman
Institute in 2004, which confirmed that only a limited number of those offices either
had pursued work with minority groups or regarded it as a future priority to do so.66
There are several identifiable trends amongst those institutions that do
describe themselves as working with minority groups. First, there are striking
regional differences. In Asia and Africa, where many states have an extreme diversity
of ethnic groups and sharp divisions, there are very few reports ofminority -directed
programs of any kind.67 Some Asian institutions have been noted for occasional high
profile inquiries into riots or violent police abuse (or for their failure to inquire into
such matters), and there has been far more focus on involvement in religious conflicts
than ethnic ones.68 In Africa, those programs that do exist come in two varieties:
efforts to overcome problems of language and geography in highly linguistically
65

There may of course be a gap between publicly reported activities and actual activities, but if so,
then at a minimum these institutions do not view it as being to their advantage to advertise their work
with minority groups.
66
Proceedings of International Ombudsman Institute Quebec Conference (Sep. 7-9, 2004) (notes on
file with author) (hereafter “IOI notes”).
67
Two unusual exceptions are South Africa’s Commission for the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities, see http://www.crlcommission.org.za/index.html and India’s National
Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, see http://ncscst.nic.in/home.htm.
68

See, e.g., Shameem, supra note __, at 662.
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divided and rural states, and efforts to discourage traditional practices that run afoul of
human rights norms. However, reporting by these institutions is itself inconsistent.69
In Mexico and Central and South America, a few more states reported at least
some specialized programs and offices.70 Without exception, these are devoted to
indigenous groups: none report programs relating to other minority groups. However,
upon investigation, only a few of these programs could be confirmed to be active.71 In
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand there areoffices, commissioners and programs
devoted to indigenous groups, often on the provincial level, and these report
substantially more activity than their Central and South American counterparts. 72
National and regional human rights institutions in these states have also taken on high
profile discrimination cases, and human rights commissions in Canada may be either
exclusively or primarily devoted to anti-discrimination efforts.73 In local and
municipal institutions in the United States, with few exceptions, any programs
directed at minority groups are focused solely upon anti-discrimination initiatives.
The exceptions, as in the other American states and Australia and New Zealand, are
for indigenous groups.74
69

The lack of empirical data about human rights practices in Africa has been noted by other scholars.
See Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human
Rights in the African State, 22 Human Rts. Q. 838, 840 (2000). I found African institutions less likely
to make information available over the internet, less likely to report regularly to regional and
international institutions, and less likely to be the subject of scholarly reports, than European,
American, and Australian institutions.
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Yes: Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela Ecuador, Mexico No: Belize, Costa Rica,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Parguay, Uruguay
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Confirmed: Guatemala, Peru Venezuela, Mexico Not confirmed: El Salvador, Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador
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A prominent example is the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner in
Australia. In these states, minority-directed work is frequently carried out on the regional or local
level. See, e.g., Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission website,
www.humanrights.gov.au/socialjustice/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
73
See David M. Tanovich, Racial Profiling and Police Practice in Canada: E-racing Racial Profiling,
41 Alberta L. Rev. 905, 908 (2004); Carlos Scott Lopez, Australian Immigration Policy at the
Centenary: The Quest for Control, 18 Geo. Immig. L. J. 1 (2003).
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See Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the Crisis of Post-War
Liberalism, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Labor L. 129 (2004). One exception is the Ombudsperson for
American Indian Families in Minnesota, who works to ensure that social service agencies and officials
follow the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act. See Ombudsperson for American Indian
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In Europe, in contrast, programs and institutions with the sole mandate of
addressing issues of race, ethnicity, and discrimination are rapidly expanding, driven
by European Union mandates, and in particular by a Directive requiring member
states to establish such institutions.75 Finland, for example, has long had an
ombudsperson for foreigners but recently expanded that office to serve all ethnic
minorities in response to the EU Directive.76 In addition, Germany has both a
national and a Schleswig-Holstein regional commissioner for minorities;77 Sweden
has an ombudsman against ethnic discrimination;78 the Czech Republic has a Council
on National Minorities;79 and Hungary has a Parliamentary Commissioner for
National and Ethnic Minority Rights.80
These trends present an interesting counterpoint to the overall pattern of the
“boom in NHRIs in the 1980s and 1990s,” which “with a handful of exceptions… has
occurred in the South.”81 The exceptions to this overall pattern are the new minority
ombudsperson’s offices in Europe and the Commonwealth countries of Canada,
Australia & New Zealand: the regions that I found to be relatively involved with
minority rights.82
Next, these regional differences correspond to some extent with the existence
of regional legal frameworks encouraging certain sorts of protections. Africa and
Asia both lack any enforceable regional framework for minority protections and
national human rights institution involvement in these issues is correspondingly weak.

Families brochure (on file with author).
75
See Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment
Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, art. 13. (Official Journal L 180, 19/07/2000
P. 0022-0026).
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See EUMC Report, supra note __,at 41-44.
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See id. at 45-46.
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See id. at 46-48.
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See http://wtd.vlada.cz/files/rvk/rnm/zprava_mensiny_2001_en.pdf.
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See Lloydd & Morawa, supra note __, at 39.
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In Mexico and Central and South America, where the only reported work with
minority groups is solely with indigenous groups, there is some correlation between
ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on indigenous peoples (a convention
dominated by Latin American states) and the likelihood that a national human rights
institution will report such work or have a program or office directed at indigenous
groups.83 While the convention is not enforced by punitive measures, the ILO does
make general observations on states parties’ implementation of the treaty.84 Finally,
in Europe, there is an EU directive mandating development of anti-racism agencies,
punitive measures for enforcing the directive, and numerous regional bodies with an
interest in minority issues. Correspondingly, states are rapidly adopting minoritydirected programs.85 The focus on indigenous groups in Canada, New Zealand and
Australia and on anti-discrimination measures in the U.S. seem to be driven by
domestic political realities, as there are no apparent regional legal regimes affecting
their policies but significant internal political debate on these issues.86
There are also trends in the content of minority-directed programs. Most have
been focused on one of two issues: the accessibility of the institution’s general
services to minority groups, or anti-discrimination measures. Notably, both are issues
that fit readily within the traditional liberal vision of minority rights, as discussed in
83

Of the thirteen states in the region that have ratified the convention, eight reported some minoritydirected programs, one did not, and there were three for which no information was available. Of the
seven countries that have not ratified the convention, only one reported minority-directed programs,
three did not, and there were three for which no information was available. The ILO Convention No.
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of 21) See ILO website, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169, (last viewed Oct. 7, 2005).
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part A. (Of course, both are acceptable to, if insufficient for, liberal pluralists and
communitarians as well.)
As to the first issue, a number of institutions have developed initiatives to
increase awareness within the institutions of potential barriers to access for members
of minority groups and to reduce or remove those barriers. So, for example, the
national human rights commission in India, which has high rates of illiteracy among
certain minority groups, has adopted informal procedures for accepting complaints
rather than requiring complaints to be filed in writing.87 Some institutions have
undertaken publicity programs aimed at extending their reach beyond the urban
centers into rural communities. The Ugandan Human Rights Commission has
broadcast information over the radio in local languages in an effort to reach rural and
illiterate segments of the population.88 Representatives of the Mexican National
Commission for Human Rights have visited some indigenous areas to solicit and
accept complaints directly.89
Another way of improving accessibility is to establish local and provincial
offices. Doing so may have synergetic effects. Atthe most basic level, a single
national office may be geographically inaccessible to most of the population,
especially in states with substantial rural populations and poor transportation and
communication.90 In countries with numerous minority groups, local offices are
better placed to provide services directed at the particular groups in their area.
Whereas the national office of the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative
Justice in Ghana accepts complaints only in the country’s major languages, it hires
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speakers of local languages for its regional and district offices.91 Also, some
institutions have hired local minority representatives for its staff or have given
minority community leaders positions among the commission or ombudsperson
officials.92
At least one case study suggests that measures and programs specifically
directed at local minority populations are at times effective not only because they are
objectively more accessible but in part because they signal interest in and seriousness
about addressing minority community concerns, establishing credibility with that
community and increasing community members subjective willingness to approach
the institution.93 However, if not staffed with minority peoples or supported by the
community, such outreach can breed suspicion on the basis of past experiences of
discrimination.94 And of course, such programs also run the risk of cabining minority
concerns to only certain offices and officers, and reducing the accountability of the
institution as a whole to minority groups.
Next, while many national human rights institutions may not make a priority
of minority concerns or report programs directed at minority groups, few if any would
exclude claims of affirmative government discrimination or oppression from their
mandates, at least in principle (whereas other kinds of minority claims, such as those
advocated by liberal pluralists and communitarians may or may not fall within
individual institutions’ mandates). If an institution does report work on substantive
minority claims, it is most likely to be on discrimination issues. Amongst these
institutions, there is a striking contrast between those that deal with minority issues
91
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primarily when high profile cases arise but are unresponsive to daily complaints, and
those that are reported to work steadily on everyday claims. Carolyn Evans describes
high profile investigations of violent conflicts targeting religious minorities by human
rights commissions in the Philippines and India,95 and other commentators also note a
similar focus on high profile claims to the exclusion of daily concerns in the work
done by other Asian institutions.96
Apart from the issues of access and discrimination, a few national human
rights institutions do address minority claims of the kind advocated in the new
minority rights treaties and by liberal pluralists and communitarians: claims for
protection of particular cultural rights, for example. However, such claims are
pursued almost exclusively by specialized institutions whose core mandate is work
with minority groups, and who are backed by a legal framework establishing those
rights in national law. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National
and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary, for example, enforces the constitutionally
established rights of national minorities to practice their language and culture.97
In my discussions with officers of the Swedish and Hungarian minority
ombudsman’s offices, each reported a sharp division in their work between the claims
brought by different minority groups. Although indigenous groups in Sweden were
entitled to sweeping cultural protections, claims from these groups were rare. Instead,
most claims were brought by members of immigrant groups concerning either
discrimination or access to government social and economic benefits.98 Similarly, the
95
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Hungarian ombudsperson reported that his work was divided between the claims of
groups recognized as “national minorities,” who have a long-standing connection to
Hungary, are entitled to certain protections for language and culture, and represent
roughly 25% of claims, and the Roma, who have no such protections, face severe
discrimination, seek socio-economic benefits from the government, and file 75% of
claims.99
But minority-directed programs aimed at particular cultural practices are more
likely to be targeting human rights violations within minority communities than
defending minority interests against external threats. Ghana’s Commission for
Human Rights and Administrative Justice has taken on controversial practices such as
witchcraft accusations and trokosi, a form of forced labor and sex slavery.100 The
Mexican human rights commission has criticized tribal courts for failing to follow due
process standards.101 Other commissions have challenged community practices such
as child marriage and reviewed procedures in local and religious courts.102 Indeed,
oversight of indigenous communities is the sole mandate of some institutions: the
Métis Settlement Ombudsman in a Canadian regional government institution
established in 2003 solely to hear complaints of maladministration and conflicts of
interest against the General Council of the Métis Settlements, an indigenous
community granted some rights of autonomy and self-government by the Alberta
government.103
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Finally, in at least a few cases, ombudspersons’ offices have been established
precisely to address acute ethnic tensions. In Kosovo, the OSCE established an
ombudsperson’s office in 1999 in the context of UN administration of the protectorate
that maintains the forced peace between Serbs and Albanians there. In 2004, it
created a Deputy Ombudsperson for minority communities to address the particular
needs of the Serbs living separately in guarded enclaves.104 In Bosnia &
Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords mandated establishment of a Human Rights
Commission made up of a Human Rights Ombudsman to investigate human rights
complaints and a Human Rights Chamber to hear cases.105

Northern Ireland is

another example of this phenomenon.106
But in many severely divided states, national human rights institutions seem to
play no role in addressing minority concerns at all.107 In Nigeria, for example, with
its hundreds of ethnic groups and its notorious propensity for ethnic and religious
conflict, the ombudsperson’s office reports no efforts to either reach minority
populations or work on minority issues, and while the National Human Rights
Commission lists numerous themes and goals on its website, discrimination, ethnic
conflict, and minority rights are not among them.108 The Indonesian National Human
Rights Commission has no resources directed to minority groups or concerns, nor
even any branch offices to serve the numerous groups scattered along the nation’s
104
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vast archipelago.109 The ethnic and religious divisions in Indonesia are of the utmost
urgency, spurring not just political opposition and violent conflict, but even full scale
war by separatist movements far from the capital. Nonetheless, the commission has
been notoriously uninvolved in these concerns, such that activists in Irian Jaya, where
the commission has at least carried out a few high profile investigations, regard it as
essentially a “foreign institution.”110 Sudan has both an ombudsperson’s office and an
advisory commission on human rights in Khartoum. These offices do not seem to
have been available to the people of Darfur who claim that local police asked them for
bribes and jailed them when they complained of others grazing on their land, events
that were part of the build-up to the current violence there.111
3.

Crucial Factors Limiting Minority Group Programs

a.

International and Regional Legal Regimes

If what transitioning states are looking for in creating national human rights
institutions is to gain political capital with the United Nations and other international
institutions as much as to make strides in promoting human rights, then it is telling
that the U.N. benchmarks for the success of these institutions do not mention minority
rights. In 1993, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Paris Principles, which set
minimum standards for national human rights institutions’ functions, authority,
resources, and independence from government influence.112 The United Nations and
other international organizations use the Principles as the primary test for certifying

109

See ICHRP report, supra note __, at 28-29.
Id. at 33.
111
See Ombudpersons links page, http://www.ombudsman.bc.ca/links/intl_ombuds/index.htm; Tim
Judah, The Stakes in Darfur, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 12 (Jan. 13, 2005).
112
See Principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and
promotion of human rights (Oct. 1991) (endorsed by UN Commission on Human Rights, resolution
1992/54 (March 1992) and by UN General Assembly, resolution A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993)
(hereafter “Paris Principles”). The United Nations has supported the development of national human
rights institutions since the 1960s. It has sponsored a series of international meetings of representatives
of national human rights institutions, and various guidelines and principles have emerged from these
meetings, including the Paris Principles. See UNHCR Fact Sheet, supra note __.
110

Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs –Page 34

agencies as national human rights institutions and for judging their competence and
independence.113
The ParisPrinciplesare not intended to and

do not offer incentives for

institutions to work closely with minority groups or on minority rights. In short,
although the Principles do make reference to discrimination, pluralism, and
“vulnerable groups,” their requirements can be met without any involvement in
minority issues or with minority groups at all.114 Furthermore, UN assistance
programs tend to be generic, untailored to particular countries, much less to work with
particular minority groups.115 From the perspective of transitioning states’ interest in
demonstrating measurable progress toward establishing independent, effective human
rights institutions, therefore, the UN benchmarks give them little reason to invest in
institutional capacity to address minority concerns. Indeed, to the contrary: in order
to gain the hoped-for economic and political benefits for compliance with
international norms, states must put the limited resources they are willing to allocate
to national human rights institutions into the UN-identified agenda.
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Recently, there have been indications of an increasing recognition of the
relevance of minority group interests, both within the UN and at international
meetings of national human rights institutions.116 In particular, some of the
declarations that have emerged from these meetings have acknowledged the tensions
between minority groups and human rights claims, by raising the issue of how and to
what extent human rights should be adapted to local cultures, at times gingerly and at
times with a sense of grievance against cultural imperialism, but without reaching any
consensus on the question.117 These developments highlight another fundamental
limitation of the Paris Principles: the document’s approach is both formal and
formulaic, taking the legal texts of human rights instruments as its foundation, treating
the content of human rights as unproblematic, and viewing the promotion of human
rights as a one-way transfer of these values from the UN system to receptive national
governments. As such, it lacks any contextual framework acknowledging the variety
of national and ethnic settings in which national human rights institutions operate or
the potential for the institution to be caught in conflicts between human rights-defined
interests.
In contrast, it is notable that the most dramatic shift toward minority concerns,
the establishment of ombudspersons’ offices for minority groups in Europe, has been
driven by precisely the opposite legal reality: an EU directive on racial and ethnic
discrimination issued in 2000 requires states to establish independent institutions to
assist with complaints, carry out surveys, and provide reports and recommendations
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on combating discrimination.118 This is not a mere suggestion to member states.
States must report on their progress in implementing the directive at regular intervals,
and they can ultimately be brought to the European Court of Justice and ordered to
pay damages for failure to comply.119 In addition, the European Union has set high
standards in minority protections for countries seeking entry to the Union. In order to
gain the economic, political and social benefits of accession, those countries are
meeting the EU standards both with substantive guarantees for their minorities and
with human rights institutions designed to ensurethem.

120

The influence of other regional institutions and systems, such as the InterAmerican Human Rights system and the African Commission on Human Rights, upon
the involvement of national human rights institutions in minority issues bears no
comparison to the European Union. While these systems do promote some minority
and indigenous rights in principle, they do not require that member states establish
national human rights institutions to address these issues, much less enforce such
requirements with punitive mechanisms.121
b.

Limited Political Purposes and Resources

There are also a number of political and institutional reasons that a national
human rights institution might not wish to involve itself with minority concerns. In
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some cases, the political purposes for establishing a national human rights institution
has been to forestall criticism of human rights practices with a toothless institution, so
that the last thing decision- makers want is to make the institution more accessible or
effective.122 While national human rights institutions are officially empowered to
carry out investigations against their governments, some lack the institutional clout or
resources to do so. A number of national human rights institutions do not exercise the
far-reaching powers they possess on paper but limit their activities primarily to less
controversial and less resource-intensive educational programs and public awareness
campaigns.123 Furthermore, an institution may face a truly daunting array of human
rights abuses by its government, so that minority concerns, however serious and
fundamental, may simply not be its highest priority. Even if such an institution is
operating in good faith and receiving government cooperation, it may be still in the
early stages of institution-building, lacking the capacity for extended projects or
programs.124
As one would expect, it is states with greater resources, both financial and
political, that tend to have established more elaborate and extensive programs,
including programs aimed at minority groups. Thus, for example, although Australia’s
indigenous population is relatively small, it has designated a human rights
commissioner to promote the rights of its aboriginal people.125 In contrast, in
Malaysia, where society is polarized along ethno-religious lines and these differences
are built in to the basic structures of government, the Malaysian Human Rights
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Commission has no commissioner dedicated to these issues. Rather, it has kept silent
when faced with complaints of infringement of religious rights, limiting itself to
private hearings and occasional neutral statements urging inter-faith dialogue.126
Indeed, in some cases there tends to be an inverse relationship at work: the more
central and significant minority concerns are to a state, the more resources and
political clout it would take to address them, and so the less likely they are to be
addressed.127
There are also reasons that are tied in to the nature of the minority communitystate relationship and the relationship between minority and human rights. The
national human rights institution is inherently a national, state entity. Although its
mandate may be investigation of government abuse, it is nonetheless structured by
and for the purposes of the government. As a political matter, the national human
rights institution may perceive itself or may be perceived as being a part of the
national government in a national – local conflict of the sort that drives many minority
rights concerns. A national institution, located in the capital cityand created by
national authorities, may not have an understanding of or sympathy for minority
views, particularly as such concerns are held by distant, rural populations and
particularly as they implicate other government interests. By the nature of the
appointment process, the members of national human rights institutions are likely to
be urban political and social elites with development-oriented agendas that view
minority concerns as ultimately subservient to the greater good of the state interest in
economic and social progress. In short, the national human rights institution may well
be a political or national agent – whether by political motive or merely as an effect of
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its members, structure and overall design – rather than a neutral body in interactions
with minority groups.
Finally, beyond these questions of institutional identity and political
involvement, the institution may also face a conflict within its mandate to promote
human rights. Minority claims may conflict with other human rights agendas.
Neither the Paris Principles nor other aspects of the institution’s mandate direct it as
to how to balance competing rights, or even seem to acknowledge that such conflicts
might arise.
Without becoming bogged down in an analysis of the formidable financial and
political difficulties that national human rights institutions functioning in transitional
states face, there are certainly reasons enough that these young agencies might not yet
be ready or able to take on the complexities of minority group claims. But when
national human rights institutions do nonetheless grapple with minority concerns,
their experiences are revealing.
C.

Implications for Democracy Theory of Minority Rights

National human rights institutions’ limited involvement in minority concerns
can be explained at least in part by the failures of resources, of political will, or of
relevant regional incentives discussed above. But this pattern may signal something
else as well: that the current understandings of minority rights are not entirely
applicable in the places they are being ignored. Echoing Leslye Obiora, perhaps
“what is often mistaken for apathy might actually be the most poignant commentary
on the limitations of the approach.”128 At a minimum, this pattern ought to spur us to
consider what limitations there may be on the direct transplantation of minority rights
and democracy theory.
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In severely divided states, the relationships between ethnic and religious
groups are fundamental to the nature and stability of the state. Accordingly, the
decisions that a newly developing state makes about how to accommodate those
groups in its legal and political system are among the most important for its success,
and for its survival. But, as most severely divided states are only now in the process
of democratic transition, theories of the role of minority rights in a democracy have
been developed primarily in the context of longstanding liberal democracies that are
less severely divided.129 Although each of the theorists discussed in section A above
came to different conclusions about the proper balance of liberal and minority rights
within the state, all “took for granted” (as Kymlicka puts it) in staking their positions,
that the state in question was a well-established liberal democracy and that the
fundamental tension to be resolved in considering minority claims was that between
those claims and the liberal values at the core of the state’s identity.130
Do the theories formulated in these distant contexts provide a good framework
for managing multiculturalism within new democracies? The theorists themselves
offer only highly qualified responses to this question,131 and critics have pointed to
extensive social, political, economic and historical differences as discrediting efforts
to apply these theories out of their original context.132 Whether these theories are
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relevant to these new contexts remains an open question.133 It is also a vital question,
because these theories are being actively exported to new democracies, in the form to
the treaties, constitutions, and EU obligations discussed above, and in the form of the
national human rights institutions that are the subject of this article.134
The experiences of national human rights institutions support the views of
those who suggest that these theoretical conceptions of minority rights do not translate
directly to new democracies, and particularly to severely divided ones. A common
critique of these theories as applied to transitioning states and emerging democracies
has been that because these groups take the characteristics of the liberal democratic
state as a fixed point, their focus has been on the tension between accommodating
minority groups and protecting liberal rights, and not on the tensions that minority
claims present vis-à-vis other interests of the state.135 The views and experiences of
national human rights institutions suggest that, indeed, this focus has caused theorists
to marginalize other concerns that are central to newly democratizing states. Minority
rights are certainly a useful rhetorical and legal device for rebutting state intervention,
just as human rights provide a useful rhetorical and legal device for a state looking for
a reason to intervene in minority communities. But the experiences of national human
rights institutions suggest thatthe “problem cases” that have always existed on the
fringes of democratic theory and positive law are no longer the exception, but rather,
are becoming the most important, significant and frequent minority claims that
national human rights institutions face in reality.
1.

Core Interests of the State
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First, as suggested above, democracy theory overstates the extent to which
liberal rights are the core interest that the state wishes to protect and with which it
identifies. This became apparent at the International Ombudsman Institute meeting in
September 2004, during a group discussion of the ombudsperson’s proper role in
promoting minority rights. While the discussion began with classic liberal
restatements of minority interests as extensions of liberal interests (“the
Ombudsman’s traditional role of protecting citizens from excesses in government
power means that we have particular responsibilities towards those who are
vulnerable or marginalised”136), it quickly shifted to other concerns: minorities’
claims to socio-economic equity (from the Argentinean ombudsperson),137 the role of
immigration and international relations (from the Swedish and European
ombudsmen),138 and minorities’ effect on national identity (from the Greek
ombudsperson).139
These varying concerns are not surprising, given the varying roles minorities
have played in the lives of states, and the differences in self-perceptions of identity
amongst these states. Governments in Central and East Europe tend to view minority
issues as a national security concern more than as a threat to liberal values, in light of
the violent inter-ethnic conflicts there.140 In Africa, not only are national security and
stability crucial issues, but few states enforce liberal rights consistently, and while
ethnic communities flourish on the social level, in the political realm ethnicity most
often is deployed as a form of patronage.141 The European Center on Racism and
136
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Xenophobia suggests that historical differences in patterns of immigration have
shaped not only the distribution of minorities within states but also “public
perceptions of their place in society and hence, public policies vis-à-vis these
minorities.”142 Finally, while many new democracies have guaranteed liberal rights in
principle, many are all too illiberal in practice.143
Liberal and communitarian democratic theory’s misplaced assumption of and
focus on the state’s liberal identity can be misleading when conflicts arise between
minority groups and the state that are, at least ostensibly about liberal values. If
applied uncritically, its principles may place too much credence in a state’s liberal
rhetoric, mistaking talk for actual devotion to those rights, overestimating the extent
to which the state actually protects liberal rights (especially vis-à-vis its minorities),
and underestimating the extent to which the state is willing to use those rights as a
weapon against minority groups without protecting them itself. In Mexico, case
studies of interactions between several indigenous groups and the Mexican
government illustratethese concerns. The Mexican government (and in at least one
case, its national human rights commission as well) have criticized indigenous legal
systems for failing to ensure due process guarantees in their internal legal systems.
There is no doubt that in fact due process norms are not followed in the communities’
courts: they are employing their own standards and procedures for judgment that do
not correspond to liberal ideals. But the Tlapanec, Tierra y Libertad and Zinacantán
communities object to using the state’s legal system not only on grounds of autonomy
or of cultural rights, but also because the Mexican government has itself failed to
guarantee crucial elements of due process, such as providing translators for non-
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Spanish speaking defendants from their communities.144 While the Mexican
government deploys the language of liberal rights in arguing that indigenous
autonomy must be limited, it does so as a rhetorical tactic, inviting us to compare
indigenous realities to liberal ideals rather than, as we should, to the realities of state
interests.
As well as overestimating the importance of liberal values to the state,
democracy theorists may also overestimate the risk of minorities creating “illiberal
enclaves” within the state, in the sense of deliberately creating systemic inequalities
within their communities. There is an intriguing pattern in the claims filed with
certain Canadian regional institutions: while some human rights claims by tribal
community members against tribal government institutions did concern systematic
gender discrimination or other systemic problems, many complained of simple
favoritism, nepotism, or abuse of power of the barest sort. For example, most of the
formal complaints received by the Métis Settlement Ombudsman in 2003 regarding
Métis Settlement leadership were such claims of nepotism, conflicts of interest, or
other failures of professional conduct.145 Similarly, while the New Brunswick
Ombudsman did receive some complaints of discrimination against tribal leadership,
many of its complaints concerned simple abuse of political authority to favor friends
and disfavor rivals.146 While such problems are obviously undesirable, they are
neither inherent to minority systems nor different in kind than the problems that arise
within liberal democratic systems.
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Accordingly, theorists might also be misjudging the extent to which any
human rights concerns that arise within minority communities will represent
fundamental conflicts between liberal and minority values. Because nepotism and
favoritism do not implicate deeply valued community principles or traditional
practices, and indeed often violate community values and customs as well as human
rights values and customs, these claims are likely to represent, not true clashes of
values, but rather, the divergence of political reality from both sets of values, minority
and liberal.147
This is not to say of course that there is not a risk of fundamental conflicts
between liberal and minority community values, for of course there are myriad
examples of irreducible conflicts, the most commonly noted being entrenched gender
discrimination.148 The Canadian cases could prove to be exceptional. But they do
raise the intriguing possibility that the traditional focus on liberal rights as the point of
conflict between minority groups and the state may tempt us to look to fundamental
differences between minority and liberal values for the cause of conflicts, rather than
considering other possibilities.
2.

Categories of Minority Groups

In addition to mischaracterizing the interest of the state as a predominantly
liberal one, democracy theory places too much weight on the historicity and
authenticity of the group’s relation to the state as the basis for the legitimacy of its
claims, and as the criterion for distinguishing between groups. In democratic theory
and positive law, recognized minority groups fall into three major categories:
147
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indigenous groups who were once hegemonic in their territory and who were
displaced by the current state or its predecessor,149 other long-standing “national
minority” groups who have long co-existed within the state,150 and new immigrant
groups.151 The implication of this typology is that these differences in historical
relationship are a good descriptor of the group’s interests vis-à-vis the state, a
correspondingly good predictor of the nature of the group’s claims, and a principled
basis for differential treatment by the state.152 This basic typology is also expressed in
the treaties and constitutional protections for minority groups, and thus law and theory
feed on and drive each other in framing these concerns.153 National human rights
institutions are, accordingly, also working with some version of this typology, as
expressed by or modified in their state’s constitutions and treaty obligations.
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No one has ever claimed that this typology is perfect; advocates have always
acknowledged the existence of problem cases on the margins.154 Nonetheless, the
typology has persisted, perhaps as much because it is effective in limiting the groups
that are entitled to rights on a basis that is difficult for them to manipulate (history), as
because it is a useful or descriptive one.155
But in new democracies and severely divided societies, the problem cases in
this typology move from the margins to center stage: they are the majority of cases
instead of the few. In some new democracies the kinds of groups that have always
formed democratic theory’s problem cases have been and continue to be more
numerous and conflict-ridden than those in the established democracies where this
typology was developed. As mentioned above, the Hungarian Ombudsman for Ethnic
and National Minorities receives 75% of his claims from the Roma, who have long
been considered a “problem case” for the typology, as they are not readily categorized
as indigenous, national minorities or immigrants, nor do their claims readily fit the
simple categories of non-discrimination, territorial autonomy, or purely cultural
rights.156
Furthermore, In many African and Asian states, many or all ethnic groups
might equally lay claim to indigenous or national minority status. In such states, this
characteristic provides no basis for distinguishing between, limiting, or even
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predicting the kinds of interests that a group will posit in its relationship to the state.
Here the typology is simply irrelevant.157
In severely divided societies, there are more likely to be groups with
unquestionably venerable historicity and authenticity, but who nonetheless present
problematic claims. For example, the position of the formerly dominant minorities in
Eastern Europe vis-à-vis formerly dominated majorities defies the analysis of liberal
and communitarian theory. In Kosovo, the ombudsperson’s reference to “the
minority” inevitably means reference to the Serbs, with whom the majority Kosovar
Albanians were engaged in violent conflict only a few years ago, and who were
themselves the majority only a few years ago.158 Similarly, for the human rights
institutions of the Baltic states, the minority is the Russian population, many of whom
came to the region while it was under Soviet rule.159 The claims of these once
dominant national minorities to protection of the language and culture may be
formally identical to those of other national minorities in other states, but the
philosophical justifications for those claims and the political and social reaction that
the ombudsperson’s offices face in addressing them are quite different. For these
severely and at times violently divided societies, the question is not whether these
groups have maintained authentic and continuous traditions, but whether traditions
that have been forcibly imposed by one group upon another can or should be secured
thereafter.
Furthermore, it appears that the number of problem cases are increasing.
Ethnic identities persist even as internal cultural traditions are rapidly changing and
157
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being reshaped by interaction with other groups and with international influences.160
This phenomenon is of course not unique to severely divided societies. In Canada, the
Métis have long presented a “problem case” in that their ethnic heritage is a mix of
indigenous and immigrant peoples. Recently they have begun developing joint forms
of governance and adjudication in cooperation with the regional Alberta government,
based in part on their own customs and in part on the customs of the state.161 In
Mexico, indigenous groups have formed new local legal and political systems that
mix indigenous and non-indigenous forms of government.162 In Europe, political lines
are shifting, and ombudspersons there are increasingly receiving claims from
foreigners and migrants, seeking to define and make use of changes in their status as
the EU consolidates, leaving them no longer immigrants, but not national minorities
or indigenous groups either.163 In complexly divided societies with hundreds of
ethnic groups, and in transitioning states engaged in rapid processes of social and
political change, these blended peoples and systems are becoming the norm, not the
exception.
Wherever groups reshape themselves and their traditions but nonetheless
maintain some separate ethnic identity, they pose challenges not just to the typology,
but to the fundamental concepts of democratic theory. For some of these groups defy
easy categorization precisely because their characteristics and concerns belie the
philosophical justifications that underlie those categories. In such cases, it will be
hazardous to rely on authenticity or the historical relationship of the group to the state
to define the legitimacy or nature of its claims.
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3.

Socio-economicC laims, Equity, and Limited Resources

Liberal and communitarian theorists may also be underestimating the
importance of socio-economic concerns, claims for equity rather than equality, and
limited resources in the minority – state struggle for power and control. First, some
claims by minority groups against external authorities may be better understood as
socio-economic claims or collective claims for substantive equity rather than liberal
claims for autonomy or procedural equality. This is true, first of all, even in the states
in which the theorists are based. In her case study of the New Brunswick Human
Rights Commission, Shannon Williams was informed by local Native Americans that
they were reluctant to pursue claims through the commission in part because they did
not view investigation and remedying of their individual claims of discrimination
against other individuals as addressing the systemic problems they observed:
“cases of discrimination [are] treated as isolated events and removed
from the economic and social causes of inequity. As Aboriginal critics
observe, the discrimination experienced by Native people is by its
nature social, and is based on collective identities and status.
Reluctance to pursue the occurrence of discrimination in broader social
contexts owing to limited resources, narrow legislative mandates or lack
of organization will contributes to the perception that human rights
codes are impotent measures for achieving social justice.”164
In accounts of human rights conflicts with minority groups in Africa, this
disjunct between the socio-economic equity concerns of the minority group and the
equality and freedom concerns of human rights advocates is even more
pronounced.165 In human rights activists’ descriptions of their efforts to raise concerns
about unequal gender norms and harmful traditional practices within minority
communities, repeatedly the women who are the members of those communities
characterize their concerns first and foremost as demands for social and economic
164

Williams, supra note __, at 126. Indeed, a number of the claims brought to the commission
concerned basic living conditions and economic status rather than discrimination, which is the
commission’s mandate. See id. at 51-77.
165
See Ekoh, supra note __.

Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs –Page 51

goods; and repeatedly, human rights activists brush aside those claims to emphasize
instead the need for gender equality. In a particularly acute example of these
fundamentally different conceptions of the good, Leti Volpp tells the story of
filmmakers traveling in Africa to make a film opposing female genital cutting
practices. While visiting a community, they asked a group of women about their
feelings on the subject. In response, the women explained that what they really
needed was a truck to carry their produce to the market.166 This is not a story of a
conflict between Western liberal values and minority cultural values (as female
genital cutting is usually characterized), but of a clash between Western liberal values
and minority socio-economic claims. Minority groups may not regard their concerns
as cultural or liberal, but rather as a demand for equity, for a share of the tangible
goods of society.167
Liberal theorists’ tendencies to emphasize the liberty and recognition aspects
of minority claims and to minimize the socio-economic aspects may reflect those
theorists’ efforts to minimize the nature of the conflicts between minority claims and
liberal rights, and thereby to provide for the maximum possible range of acceptable
(to them) minority claims. As discussed above, states will generally recognize, and
courts will generally enforce, only those minority rights that can be characterized as
individual rights, not collective ones. The more a claim resembles a traditional liberal
claim for freedom and procedural equality, rather than a socio-economic or group
claim, the more likely the plaintiff is to be granted standing and the claim is to be
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found justiciable. However, in cases where the essence of the claim is in fact
collective or focused on equity, the trade-off for this justiicability is an essential
mischaracterization of the nature of the claim itself.168 Another trade-off is in the
available remedy: the remedy for an individual discrimination claim is likely to be
more limited than the remedy that would be necessary to redress a claim for collective
socio-economic benefits.
Theorists also tend to give short shrift to the limits on state power and capacity
that make effective enforcement of any rights, liberal or minority, a pipe dream for
many new democracies. In some states, government infrastructure has not infiltrated
very far beyond the capital city, and even liberal freedoms, well-established in
principle, are at the whim of local officials. The lists of rights promised in the new
minority treaties require programs that are well beyond the capacities of states with
limited resources, and especially states with numerous disparate groups. For example,
Adeno Addis notes that “many countries, especially developing countries, are faced
not with two or three, but with dozens of languages. Under those circumstances, it is
likely to be financially prohibitive and administratively chaotic to attempt to give
equal status to all languages that are spoken in the polity.”169 Again and again,
national human rights institutions in transitioning states report a lack of the necessary
funding and resources to perform their functions; frequently, they operate only in the
capital city and not far beyond170
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But the implications of these facts are more far- reaching than simply a
practical obstacle to rights enforcement. On the one hand, they mean thatany set of
rights supposedly guaranteed by the state may be utterly ephemeral, so that talking
about a conflict, for example, between liberal rights and minority rights may be an
entirely theoretical debate, the human rights equivalent of theological treatises on the
number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.
But beyond this, the state may not be in the position of having the power to
grant or deny rights or autonomy to its minority community at all. Rather, minority
communities in some states are in the position of de facto governing themselves, and
the state may not be have the capacity to challenge minority authority or to replace it
with governance systems of its own.171 The issue of minority rights may arise only at
the moment thatthe state gains enough power to challenge the status quo self governance by minority groups and attempts to eliminate or reduce minority
autonomy. This presents a very different context for considering minority claims and
any challenges they pose to liberal rights or other state interests.
4.

Criteria for Decision-making

While it may be possible to characterize conflicts between minority groups
and the state in terms of liberal and minority rights, that does not necessarily mean
that human rights analysis or norms will provide a basis for decision-making or
distinguishing between claims. Because of all the gaps between liberal theory and the
reality of severely divided new democracies discussed above, democratic theories of
minority rights may not provide effective criteria for resolving those conflicts.
Even where a minority does not itself perceive its claims as being based in
recognized rights, the group may be tempted to do so by the existence of human rights
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as an effective way of recharacterizing minority claims to make them cognizable in
court or before human rights institutions. For example, the Northern Ireland Human
Rights Commission was asked to help define standards for the parades that are a
tradition of both the Protestant and Catholic communities and that frequently present a
flashpoint for conflict. While originally, neither community construed its concerns as
a human rights claim, now the issues are being redefined in human rights terms.172
But according to Dominic Bryan’s case study, “what human rights approaches have
been good at is holding the state accountable for the activities of the police and of its
commissions and officials,” but “human rights instruments are not nearly so effective
in providing guidance for inter-communal disputes.” Rather than providing factors
for balancing the parties’ respective interests and concerns, the introduction of human
rights norms has merely encouraged government agencies to “couch… their decision
in the language of rights” all the while “adopting a standardized boilerplate format for
their determinations.”173 In this case at least, the addition of human rights standards
has merely provided another gloss on the situation, rather than a principled basis for
distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable parades.
As suggested above, democratic theories developed in well-established liberal
democracies may emphasize factors that are tangential in severely divided or
transitioning societies, factors such as the historicity of a group’s claim or the
potential conflict it presents with liberal values that the state itself may not effectively
enforce. But if applying minority rights in the ways suggested by liberal and
communitarian democratic theory misconstrues the crucial issues and interests at
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stake, it may in turn merely complicate and obscure the conflict, rather than providing
a principled basis for resolving it174
D.

What Role Could National HumanR ights Institutions Play?

In part B, I discussed the pragmatic reasons that national human rights
institutions have not been as involved as they could be in minority concerns, and in
part C I suggested that their disinterest in some part also reflects the fact that minority
interests do not fall neatly into the liberal and minority rights categories predicted by
democracy theory and defined by positive law. But while democracy theory may
have mistaken the nature of at least some minority claims in severely divided and
transitioning states, national human rights institutions may nonetheless be able to
effectively address and remedy those claims. Not only this, they may be able to play
a role long promoted by democracy and human rights advocates, but ill defined by
them: that of a forum for productive dialogue between minority groups and the state.
I will first consider the role national human rights institutions might play in regard to
minority groups generally, and then their role in regard to indigenous groups with
their own legal and political systems.
1.

Roles vis-à-vis Minority Groups Generally

By their nature, national human rights institutions are well designed to address
at least some of the minority group concerns that do not fit the predicted mold. For
example, Bruce Berman suggests that one of the fundamental obstacles to the
development of effective democratic governance and iner-ethnic stability in Africa is
that government bureaucracy functions according to destructive clientelism defined
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along ethnic lines.175 Similarly, in the experience of ombudspersons who served
indigenous communities, a large percentage of the complaints brought against
community leadership concerned conflicts of interest and nepotism.176 The
ombudsperson, with her mandate of rooting out government maladministration and
favoritism of every kind, is ideally suited to address such concerns.
However, the capacity of individual national human rights institutions to
address the disparate demands of minority communities discussed above depends to a
large degree on their similarly disparate structure and legal mandates.177 Some
unanticipated claims, like the above claims of corruption, will fall neatly into the
ombudsperson’s or commissioner’s jurisdiction, while others, like the socio-economic
claims discussed previously, will not.
But the gaps between experience and theory discussed above also suggest
another, more systemic role for national human rights institutions: that of developing
a better understanding of minority concerns and best practices principles for
addressing them. As has been illustrated by the results of my study, when national
human rights institutions are accessible to minority groups and receptive to their
claims, they obtain a wealth of direct information about the groups’ interests and
concerns, including some that fall outside the typical understandings of minority
group rights. However, this information is nowhere collected or considered, and so it
has not been taken into account in formulating policy or theory on such rights.
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There is one institutional practice in particular that could serve as a resource
for discovering and understanding minority concerns that are not currently addressed
in minority rights law and theory: “good offices.” “Good offices” refers to a national
human rights institution’s use of its contacts, influence and mediation experience to
conciliate a claim that does not actually fall within the institution’s formal
jurisdiction.178 Good offices practices vary considerably between institutions: some
institutions will offer to conciliate virtually any claim that comes in the door, whereas
others stick closely to the terms of their mandate.179 In New Brunswick, for example,
where the human rights commission’s mandate is narrowly limited to discrimination
and to events on non-tribal lands, one-third of cases were good offices cases,
including complaints of political favoritism and discrimination against tribal leaders,
as well as derogatory comments by public officials and the media, and other incidents
falling outside the commission’s strictly defined jurisdiction.180 The commission in
Ghana also encourages its local offices to accept good offices cases.181 Where
institutions do offer good offices services, a systematic evaluation of those cases
might yield valuable information about local concerns.
In the same vein, because the resolutions reached by national human rights
institutions are neither binding nor precedent-creating, they present an opportunity for
experimentation with a range of solutions for minority group problems and for
development of “best practices” guidelines. Because minority interests are, as
discussed above, so relational and contextual, some trial and error is in fact likely to
be necessary in national, regional and local contexts to find good solutions. As with
178
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the good offices cases generally, if information were collected and made available in a
systematic way, national human rights institutions could serve as a laboratory for
ideas that might ultimate percolate up to the national level or be adopted by
institutions in other regions.
These possibilities offer a pragmatic approach to an ethereal concept long
promoted by both democracy theorists and human rights advocates as a prescription
for conflicts between minority groups and the state: dialogue. In this context, dialogue
seems to mean all things to all people. Democracy theorists envision a fundamental
constitutional negotiation of the essential nature of the relationship between minority
groups and the state, along the lines of James Tully’s’ proposal for a “post-imperial
dialogue on the just constitution of culturally diverse societies”182 In the new
minority rights treaties, dialogue is not the basis for establishing a just framework for
the state but rather an iterative, ongoing process of consultation and participation in
governance.183 Others propose dialogue for the purpose of nation-building in severely
divided societies. Adeno Addis suggests that “a genuine sense of shared identity,
social integration, in multicultural and multiethnic societies will develop only through
a process where minorities and majorities are linked in institutional dialogue.”184
Similarly, Leslye Obiora propose that “’dialogic democracy’ – recognition of the
authenticity of the other, whose views and ideas one is prepared to listen to and
debate, as a mutual process – is the only alternative to violence in many areas of the
social order where disengagement is no longer a feasible option.’”185 But these
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theorists do not suggest how these dialogues might take place, nor what particular
characteristics would be necessary to provide an adequate forum for their envisioned
dialogues.186
Certainly human rights institutions present a forum for dialogue of some sort
between minority groups and the state over human rights values. And if they were to
establish a process of systemically collecting and considering the information they
receive from minority claimants, this dialogue could become a multi-layered one,
moving from the local level to the national and back again, and accreting mutual
understanding over time. But can the sort of dialogue carried on in national human
rights institutions achieve such lofty goals as nation-building, social integration, and
constitutional negotiation?
In discussing the question of the ombudsperson’s role vis-à-vis minority
groups at the International Ombudsman Institute conference in Quebec last year, the
participating ombudspersons considered that the terms of their interactions with
minority groups were already set by external influences: the legal frameworks for
their offices, and the constraints of institutional competence and credibility. A
national human rights institution’s mandate and its powers of investigation and
reporting go more to enforcing known and understood legal rights than to defining
those rights in the first place.187 Where the basis for minority rights is limited, where
the balance between minority rights, individual rights and state values is a hotly
debated political question, and especially where there is of yet no established legal
186
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framework for weighing this balance, involvement in these issues takes the institution
well outside its usual activities and stretches its credibility and legitimacy both with
the government and with the public.188 In new democracies where rights are as yet ill
defined, the national human rights institution may find itself playing this role,
particularly through mechanisms like the good offices claims.189

However, it is not

clear that these institutions will, except at times by happenstance, have the legal and
political resources to do so effectively. Furthermore, while the institution may have
the authority to recommend change, it does not have the authority itself to enact that
change either upon the law or the essential political structure of the state, and so it is
not in a position to negotiate fundamental constitutional change of the sort envisioned
by many democracy theorists for cross-cultural dialogue.
Due to these legal and institutional constraints, national human rights
institutions are not well positioned to undertake the sort of “constitutional dialogue”
advocated by some democracy theorists nor to address highly politicized and
fundamental decisions about minority and majority interests. When minority interests
strike at the core of a state’s identity and power relationships, a national human rights
institution can never serve as more than a limited forum for dialogue.
But a national human rights institution may be well suited for productive
dialogue in less fraught situations, where it has the flexibility and accessibility to
explore minority interests and to accrete knowledge of them gradually over time. An
institution that is receptive to minority claims is in a unique position, not only to
address minority claims that lie beneath the surface of already identified minority
interests and rights, but also to bring those claims up to the surface where they can be
acknowledged and understood.
188
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2.

Indigenous Communities and Legal Pluralism

Furthermore, because of their particular strengths and flexibility of
procedures, national human rights institutions could also serve a productive role in
addressing the interests of indigenous groups. For states within which indigenous
groups govern themselves autonomously and maintain their own legal systems, the
power balance between indigenous groups and the state may be a crucial and
precarious one, especially if such groups make up a substantial portion of the
population. These are therefore particularly acute examples of potential conflicts
between minority and human rights. And when they interact with these groups,
national human rights institutions face additional levels of complexity in dealing with
what are in essence separate legal and political systems within the state.
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that indigenous communities and
cultures themselves are not singular but multiple, and differ amongst each other as to
values and practices as much as any one of them does to state structures. Bedouin
blood feuds, for example, have little in common with Native American sentencing
circles. Likewise, the state structures and cultures in which such communities act
range from liberal democracies to authoritarian governments to failed states, and from
states with strong national identities to sharply divided states to states in which
disparate cultures rarely interact. Thus, it would be misleading to speak of conflicts
between the state and indigenous cultures as if all such conflicts were of the same
nature.
Not only this, indigenous cultures are not static but dynamic, and not
necessarily isolationist but often interactive. Indeed, community laws and legal
systems may not be ancient, customary, or based in tradition. The image (and even to
some extent the legal definition) of indigenous peoples and their practices includes all
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of these elements, and indigenous communities themselves may call on tradition or
ancient origin as legitimizing their laws and practices, even when those laws and
practices are of recent vintage. Both the state and the community may make use of
this notion of tradition as a basis for legitimacy and recognition. Therefore, it is
important to recognize that the tension between indigenous laws and state laws is not
necessarily one between old and new, between customary and written, or between
traditional and modern, but may be far more complex, reflecting the dynamic
interactions between groups and systems.190
In this sense, indigenous groups increasingly pose problem cases of the sort
discussed in part C above. The Métis in Canada, as well as the Tlapanec and other
indigenous peoples in Mexico, have formed legal and political systems that are
neither strictly indigenous nor defined by the state, but a deliberate blending of state
and community ideals and practices.191
The legal and political structures in these systems of legal pluralism also vary
considerably, particularly in the level of mutual recognition and interactivity between
indigenous and state systems. Indigenous communities may be organized into formal
political structures or may operate more as social units than political ones.
Community institutions may apply customary, religious, or other community-defined
laws in place of or in addition to formal state law. Some states’ constitutions permit
their courts to recognize indigenous communities’ legal decisions or apply some
version of the community’s laws. So, for example, the South African constitution
affirms the legitimacy of tribal institutions and laws, the Ethiopian constitution
permits the state to recognize religious courts, and the United States recognizes the
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authority of tribal courts on Native American reservations.192 But community legal
institutions need not be recognized by the state to function as the community’s legal
system.
Even though states do in some instances apply indigenous laws or recognize
indigenous legal systems, precepts of constitutional supremacy might lead one to
expect that constitutional norms, including human rights norms, would necessarily
prevail over indigenous community law or practice. Certainly, some constitutions do
expressly provide that customary practices must comply with constitutional norms,
and some courts do subject indigenous laws to constitutional mandates in the face of
constitutional silence.193 But in other states, indigenous practices are themselves
legitimized by the constitution, granting constitutional status to those practices and
creating ambiguity about precedence. For example, in Ethiopia, the constitution
recognizes the rights of its “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” along with numerous
individual rights and does not indicate which should prevail in case of a conflict.194
Other states’ constitutions expressly exempt traditional practices from certain
constitutional norms such as anti-discrimination rights.195 Within the United States,
Supreme Court decisions have granted partial but not absolute sovereignty to tribal
governments, and that sovereignty has at times been found to outweigh constitutional
interests such as equal protection.196 And of course, some constitutions and courts do
not address the issue at all.
Furthermore, it is not just state policies toward indigenous legal systems that
vary; the extent to which indigenous systems accept or reject the state’s system, and
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even the extent to which they take account of it, also varies substantially. Some
communities maintain jurisdiction over family and minor civil and criminal matters
while ceding larger cases to the state.197 Others claim jurisdiction over all issues, big
or small.198 And indigenous communities may govern areas that the state considers
private, or vice versa.199
In such contexts, minority group concerns will first be defined within the
minority community itself in the context of the community’s self-defined political and
legal system. Similarly, state concerns with community practices will confront not
merely a claimed cultural exception to human rights norms, but a separate legal and
political system operating under different norms and, at least potentially, conceiving
of the conflict in alternative legal and political terms. The systems may differ not
only in their substantive rules, but also in their processes, and even in the underlying
assumptions, cultural values, and symbols that each system deploys.200
Even where a state recognizes the indigenous system
, it is

typically the

community that must adapt to the state system in order to be heard. For example,
indigenous claims to land must be proven according to state definitions of ownership
(even if particularized to indigenous ownership), and in state institutions (land
registration offices or courts) and by state processes, (formal presentation of evidence
of ownership as defined by the state). Indigenous definitions, institutions, and
processes will not stand, if opposed by others with state definitions, institutions and
processes at their backs.201
197
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But considering indigenous claims solely in state forums undercuts the group’s
ability to characterize its claim as it understands it and also undercuts the
philosophical justifications for the state to recognize such claims in the first place. In
addition, this will not satisfy those indigenous communities that claim from the state
not only liberal ideals of tolerance and local autonomy, but also the communitarian
ideals of participation as a constituent and of cultural survival not only as an isolated
unit within the state but as an interactive, incorporated part of the state.
Requiring the indigenous community to frame its interests in the state’s terms
and pursue them through state processes and institutions also raises again the question
of what is required for meaningful dialogue between the state and its communities.
While many liberal theorists appear to endorse the notion that productive dialogue can
be had on the state’s terms, against the background of liberal institutions and values,
some indigenous groups contend that their concerns are fundamentally misstated and
misunderstood in this context. 202 Picking up this concern, communitarian
commentators contend that “the dialogue must be one in which the participants are
recognised and speak in their own languages and customary ways.”203 Meanwhile,
other theorists argue that there can be no intercultural understanding for exactly these
reasons.204 Certainly the parties must agree upon some common forum to carry on a
dialogue at all, 205 and currently such dialogue is being carried out only in state-
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defined fora such as the courts and the national human rights institutions.206 Is there
an alternative?
One possibility would be for the state to adapt to the community’s system in
certain contexts, either by participating in the community’s cultural, legal, and
political processes or by developing hybrid processes, rather than requiring the
community to adapt to its own. This would permit the indigenous group to participate
in defining the forum and theterms of discussion. Some groups such as the Métis
have already demonstrated a willingness to accept some state involvement in their
internal governance in return for the benefits of state recognition and tolerance.
As discussed above, national human rights institutions’ capacity to serve as a
forum for dialogue in the context of minority rights is limited in certain respects. But
nonetheless, these institutions might be able to participate in community processes
more readily than other state institutions could do. Because their procedures are more
informal and flexible than those of courts, most have some freedom to innovate. An
ombudsperson could conceivably appear before community courts or councils, or
could adopt a community’s arbitration practices when considering community
complaints. At the same time, because national human rights institutions lack
enforcement powers, their participation would not bind the state or pose a threat to its
sovereignty.
Another relevant feature of human rights institutions is their focus on
discussion and conciliation as a first approach to conflict. Although the extent to
which indigenous groups rely on consensual systems for conflict resolution is often
overstated, in at least some instances there may be commonalities between
pluralistic solidarity, which emphasizes dialogue among groups and societies as networks of
communication, deal with the question of linguistic plurality? … [H]ow would dialogue (and shared
deliberation) be possible without the dominant group coercively imposing a single language (more
likely its language) on all citizens?” Addis, supra note __, at 138.
206
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institutions. Ombudspersons in places as disparate as Burkina Faso and Canada
reported feeling a sense of compatibility between their techniques and local
preferences for conciliatory approaches to conflict resolution.207 The indigenous
assessment was more skeptical about the extent of the resemblance: “In order for the
commission to serve Native people they have to understand Native people. They have
to learn about Native cultures, traditions, and spirituality.”208
So far, only a few institutions have tried to apply this prescription. Even
among institutions with programs or officers devoted to an indigenous group or
groups, almost none have tried to participate in or incorporate indigenous practices in
any way. The examples I found were scattered: an ombudsperson for American
Indian Families in Minnesota engages in traditional prayer and rituals with her clients
before beginning meetings; 209 a local Argentinean ombudsperson’s office that works
extensively with the indigenous Mapuche people held a workshop to train its
employees in traditional Mapuche mediation techniques;210 and the African
Ombudsman Association discussed the topic of reclaiming traditional mediation
practices at its 2003 annual meeting. In one case, it was not a human rights
institution, but local police who adopted indigenous practices in an effort to bridge a
divide between liberal rights, security concerns, and minority rights in addressing
accusations of witchcraft and witch killings and trials.211
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However, pursuing this approach would prove problematic on levels from the
most superficial to the most fundamental. First, this is not an easy task at a pragmatic
level.. If most human rights institutions have not mustered the will and resources to
engage in simple outreach programs to minority groups, such as hiring staff who
speak local languages, it is unlikely that they will organize themselves enough to
master local legal systems. And even if undertaken in good faith, walking the
tightrope of participating in community processes without becoming a part of them is
likely to strain institutional capacity and credibility in all the ways discussed above.
Numerous authors have noted the difficulty of understanding the fundamental
concepts of another legal system.212 Even if operating with the best of intentions, an
outsider’s perception of the significant aspects of another’s system is likely to depend
on her own interests in the system. Human rights advocates, alternative dispute
resolution advocates, and others tend to selectively acknowledge and legitimize
elements of indigenous legal processes that favor their projects, such as mediation
practices, and ignore elements that would undermine their projects, such as corporal
or capital punishment. They also tend to acknowledge and legitimize community
values that align with their projects, such as respect for the environment, but to

“Described in the national media as ‘one of the few success stories in a police force that has almost
collapsed under the strain of democracy,’ Gopane uses methods that require a high level of local
knowledge. At relevant moments, he exchanges his police uniform for the paraphernalia of a
traditional healer. In him, the forensic and the oracular, scientific investigation and social diagnostics,
become one. … While such efforts remain unorthodox and limited, they do seem to be spreading; the
SAPS liaison officer in the Northwest Province, Patrick Asneng, told us that dealing with the occult has
become part of the mundane work of policing in the countryside.” John Comaroff & Jean Comaroff,
Policing Culture, Cultural Policing, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 513, 530-31 (2004)
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declare the hegemony of human rights values when there is a conflict, as in the case
of child marriage.
Beyond this, historically most efforts by states to incorporate indigenous legal
systems have represented a mechanism for state hegemony over the community,
rather than an attempt at true dialogue or genuine acceptance of community norms as
constitutive of the state. The most well known examples are those of efforts by
colonial states to codify their understanding of the customary law used by the peoples
they colonized. This was problematic on several levels: first, the colonialists rarely
got it right, second, they transplanted the customary law into the colonial system and
process and thereby changed it, and third, they used this process as a means to
implement a two-tier system of justice in which those they colonized invariably
occupied the lower tier.213 In worst case scenarios, the “customary law” system was
not just as an incident of repression among others, but as an active part of the
development of a whole repressive system, as in South Africa where
“institutionalization of customary law was thus part of a process for redistributing
power” during the colonial period in South Africa, “deceiv[ing] people into believing
that law supported their interests.”214 Colonial governments’ misapprehension of,
mischaracterization of, and misuse of indigenous religious and community legal
norms has been well documented across numerous settings and cultures.215
Such problems have not been limited to colonial settings. Rather, efforts to
import progressive values into local processes served to undermine both systems
under the communist Derg government in Ethiopia. The Derg tried to make use of a
local village council model to implement their own progressive rules on marriage, but
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the councils failed after a couple of years. From the state’s perspective, the councils
were problematic because they tended to function according to find ways to
accommodate the formal rules to local preferences. From the community’s
perspective, the council’s use of the formal rules undermined their authority, which
stemmed from knowledge of and adherence to community practices.216
By attempting to adapt or participate in indigenous legal systems, a national
human rights institution risks creating “an illusion of popular justice” that “is not
accountable via the usual democratic representative processes,”217 It also risks serving
as a mechanism for state oppression of indigenous groups, stirring up conflict by
increased interaction, and undermining its own credibility, both with the indigenous
group and with the majority. But there are ways of mitigating this risks. Of course,
such efforts should be pursued only upon an expression of interest by the indigenous
community. An indigenous community member or members might act as the
community’s representative within the institution. Depending upon community
preferences for its level of involvement, an institution might keep itself apart from
internal community systems but incorporate some aspects of the community systems
into its practices, or alternatively, might appear as a representative of the state within
the community system but make no effort to adapt community practices in its own
work.
As it is, indigenous communities have no choice but to pursue their claims in
state institutions, through state processes, according to the state’s terms. Carefully
constructed, an ombudsperson or national human rights commission might offer a
forum for or participant in dialogue that allows at least some possibility of translation.
Conclusion
216
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A final anecdote concerning the Tlapanec community in Mexico, mentioned
above, illustrates the complexities both of the relationships between minority groups
and the state and of their deployment of human rights norms as a means of exercising
power within those relationships. The Tlapanec community is an indigenous group in
Mexico that has become dissatisfied with its experiences in the Mexican judicial
system. Members of the community found the legal standards, processes, values, and
language, alien and confusing. They also found the police attention to their area
inadequate to maintain order. In response, they initiated a parallel judicial system,
which operates according to community norms and in the Tlapanec language. The
Mexican government views this as a challenge to its sovereignty.218
Human rights claims are present on all sides of this conflict. The Tlapanec
people claim violations of their due process rights by the state, because state trials are
conducted in Spanish and they are not provided with translators. They also claim
violations of their community justice norms: if an accused is imprisoned during vital
agricultural seasons, not only the defendant but his family will suffer as a result.
Finally, they claim these community rights to autonomy and self-determination
authorize their development of their own system. The Mexican government claims
that the Tlapanec legal process violates due process norms and exceeds the scope of
the community’s authority.219
The Tlapanec creation of a new legal system is a direct challenge to the
legitimacy of the Mexican government and its human rights agenda. It was developed
by the community to meet its own needs, but is not a direct continuation of ancient
practices. It is couched in part in terms of individual liberal rights, in part in terms of
minority rights, and in part in terms of alternative community norms. It shifts the
218
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balance of power in the community’s relationship with the national government by
claiming functions the state views as its own.
But although Mexico’s National Commission for Human Rights boasts an
outreach program for indigenous groups, and although its constitution was amended
in the 1990s to introduce indigenous rights, the Deputy Commissioner for Human
Rights, a devoted advocate whom I met in Quebec, shook her head blankly when
asked about the Tlapanec. She had never heard of them, and the Commission has to
her knowledge played no role whatsoever in this classic conflict over minority
rights.220
By their structure, mandates, and skills, national human rights institutions
could play a role in mitigating these disputes in democracies new and old, but often,
they do not. Lack of legal incentives, political will and resources all limit their
involvement, as do misunderstandings of what is at stake, driven by distant
democratic theory. There are some minority interests, especially those in highly
conflict-ridden states or concerning highly politicized issues that a national human
rights institution could never effectively take on. But there are others that these
institutions are well suited to address.
Liberal and communitarian theorists have looked for centering principles to
provide a fixed point to which disparate minority claims might relate and to serve as
the philosophical core justifying consideration of their concerns. Minority demands,
such as the Tlapanec’s, for tolerationof their cultural practices could be characterized,
for example, as a group demand for liberty, for group freedom from state interference.
This characterization is an appealing one on certain levels, for it frames the group’s
220
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demand in terms that resonate with liberal philosophy and can therefore be analyzed
in traditional liberal terms. Demands for liberty are common currency in our courts
and legislatures, and so these institutions feel themselves equipped to balance such
claims with other concerns. In such a construction of the demand, in any given case,
a group demand for liberty might stand in tension with an individual demand for
liberty within the group or with the state’s interest in promoting goals of equality or
security. In this vein, Kymlicka and other liberal pluralists seek to define minority
interests in terms of their relation to individual autonomy.
But while it may be appealing for these reasons to characterize minority and
indigenous interests as being claims for liberty, they do not seem to fit the mold.
Isaiah Berlin long ago argued that the desire for internal community autonomy “has
little to do with the classical Western notion of liberty as limited only by the danger of
doing harm to others.”221 He characterized this instead as a desire for “recognition –
of their class or nation, or colour or race – as an independent source of human
activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it
(whether it is good, or legitimate or not), and not to be ruled, educated, guided.”222
Rather than representing an increase in liberty amongst the group, this recognition of
community existence and independence may well reduce the liberty of its members,
who will to some extent be governed by this community identity – but who may
prefer that identity and governance to non-recognition and liberty.223 And since
Berlin, other efforts have been made to refine this notion of “recognition” or
“belonging” and the tensions it presents with guaranteed liberty rights.224
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Communitarians such as Tully have accordingly characterized minority claims as
being alternative forms of self-rule.
In so doing, however, liberal and communitarian theorists have clung to the
notion that minority concerns could be characterized in terms of some single unifying
principle, even as they recognized the relational and disparate nature of those claims.
Chandran Kukathas has cautioned against casting all minority group claims in the
same mold, and the experiences and analysis of national human rights institutions
suggest that this warning is correct.225
Indeed, one reason for the apparently diverse nature of minority rights and
claims seems to be that they are to some degree not merely related to, but actually a
projection of, the interests of the state. What the state and the majority understand to
be “minority rights” is not the set of all interests that a minority groups claims, but
rather, only the subset of those interests that do not happen, in their state, to coincide
with those of the majority. This is true of the liberal approach as well as the others:
minority interests in liberal values are not minority interests, merely ordinary ones.
So to Kymlicka and Tully, living in a liberal democratic state that guarantees
individual rights as a matter not only of course but of national identity, minority
claims appear to be claims for the autonomy to pursue community-defined, at times
illiberal values. But for other states with other concerns, minority claims resound
differently, according to their own terms of power.
In this vein, Adeno Addis’s comment on an additional aspect of minority
interests is telling:
“The complaints many cultural and ethnic minorities have against majorities is not
that they are forbidden to affirm privately their convictions and commitments and the
capacity to plead as special interests in the political and economic markets, but rather
that they ought not be seen as special, narrow and private interests while the culture
225
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and the ethnic affiliation of the majority is viewed implicitly or explicitly as
representing the general interest.”226
Because minority rights are in the end not absolute but relational, relative to
the nature of the state, democratic theory and concepts of rights based in the
experiences of well-established liberal democratic states cannot be expected to
capture the concerns of minority groups in new and severely divided democracies.
Although new democracies are adopting either liberal or communitarian forms of
government that superficially bear the forms advocated by liberal and communitarian
democratic theory, and although they may use the rhetoric of liberal and minority
rights to describe and justify their choices, their purposes in doing so and the effects
on minority group concerns are not likely to follow the predicted path. In these
complex contexts, national human rights institutions could serve as a necessary forum
for consideration of disparate and disputed minority rights.

226

Addis, supra note __, at 125.
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Appendix:

Methodology

This article is based on three lines of research: a qualitative study of the
publicly available information about national human rights institutions worldwide; a
review of case studies of individual national human rights institutions and indigenous
communities; and interviews and participation in public discussion with individual
ombudspersons.
As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of the tripartite approach was to
balance the strengths and weaknesses of each research method and to use the data
gathered in one line of research to catalyze the others. On its own, the data generated
by a broad empirical study is inevitably unmoored from the social and political
context that provides its meaning, but its results can nonetheless suggest trends and
provide a context for understanding the significance of individual cases. Likewise,
the otherwise anecdotal insights of individual cases can be measured against and
grounded in the general findings of the empirical study. These cases also suggest
crucial factors for determining which aspects of the empirical study deserve attention
and provide a spot check for the trends suggested by that study. Finally, my
conversations with ombudspersons and commissioners provided insight into and
context for both modes of research and were also an excellent source of individual
case information. I am grateful to all who generously shared their knowledge with
me.
In the following sections, I describe the selection criteria and sources used for
each of the three lines of research.
I.

Database/Qualitiative Study
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The first line of research, a survey of publicly available information about
national human rights institutions worldwide, is to my knowledge the first such study
of its kind.
A.

Selection criteria

1.
2.

All identified national human rights institutions;
Those local and regional institutions that report work with minority
groups;
Those specialized institutions that have work with minority, ethnic or
indigenous groups or on issues of discrimination and racism as their
mandate.

3.

The database includes information on all identified national human rights
institutions, including ombudspersons, human rights commissions and hybrids of
these institutions, whether they have done work with minority groups or not. It
includes data only on those local and regional institutions for which I found some
indication that they were in fact working with minority groups, and only on those
specialized institutions that work with minority or ethnic groups or on issues of
racism or discrimination.
I sought to identify national human rights institutions and the relevant
specialized institutions by searching the records of international and regional
organizations that work with such institutions, as well as through the International
Ombudsman Institute, through scholarly studies of their work, and through individual
contacts and searches of the internet. Because local and regional institutions are so
numerous, I did not actively search them out, but rather, collected data on their work
with minority groups as I came across it in other settings.
B.

Sources

1.

Primary sources
a.
National human rights institutions websites
b.
National human rights institutions reports
c.
National human rights institutions brochures and informational
materials
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d.

2.

Direct correspondence with national human rights institution
officials

Secondary sources
a.
International and regional non-governmental organization
website
b.
International and regional non-governmental organization
reports
c.
Scholarly books and articles
d.
News reporting

The database contains three basic types of information about the institutions,
to the extent that I was able to find such information: contact information, its general
functions and authority, and its work, if any, with minority groups. The first two
types of information are included solely for background purposes and are not reported
in full or for all institutions. Data on actual activities was not available for all
identified institutions. Not all human rights institutions make public reports of their
activities, and even amongst those that do, itcan be difficult to find and obtain.
Language barriers, for example, presented an obstacle, and there are disparities in the
informatino reported. There may also of course be differences between actual
activities and reported activities.
The database includes information on national human rights institutions’ own
public reporting of their work with minority groups, both on their websites and in
their public reports and informational materials. The database also contains
information from secondary sources: from the international and regional bodies that
work with national human rights institutions, and from books, articles and reports
discussing certain institutions and countries.
II.

Case studies of national human rights institutions and minority groups
A.
1.

Selection criteria
Reliability. I gave preference to case studies with characteristics
indicating reliability, such as the author’s involvement in primary
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research, availability of other reliable and relevant materials to confirm
some aspects of the data or conclusions, contact with the author, and
peer review..
2.

Factual detail concerning the subject of the study and its political and
social context.

3.

Cross-disciplinary complementarity. I gave preference to case studies
that offered insights from other relevant non-law fields, such as
anthropology.

4.

Consonance with the issues and themes raised by the other lines of
research.

B.
1.
2.

Sources
Published articles and books
Unpublished papers and doctoral dissertations

All cited case studies were undertaken by scholars or non-governmental
organizations and focused either upon a particular national human rights institution, or
upon a particular minority group, or both. I looked in particular for studies on human
rights institutions known to work with minority groups or known to work in multiethnic areas.
III.
Interviews and discussions with individual ombudspersons and
commissioners
A.
1.
2.
3.

Selection criteria
Work with minority groups
Responsiveness
Available contacts and introductions

B.

Sources

Many of the interviews and discussions cited in this article took place in
person at the International Ombudsman Institute meeting in Quebec City, Quebec in
September 2004. Other interchanges with ombudspersons and commissioners took
place by phone and e-mail. I contacted ombudspersons and commissioners based on
information indicating that they had worked actively with minority groups.
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